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INTRODUCTION 
The debate on the representational format of concepts is more 
alive than ever as witnessed by the recent cutting-edge 15 
articles in the special issue of the Psychonomic Bulletin and 
Review entitled The Representation of Concepts. Contributors 
dispute on the format of concepts. An example1 will help me to 
pinpoint what is meant by “representational format of concepts”. 
Consider the binary and decimal coding of numbers. Within the 
decimal numeral system, the number “10” is represented as 10, 
whereas within the binary numeral system the same number is 
represented as 1010. These numeral systems exploit different 
representational codes or formats to encode the same content. So 
do the contending theories in this debate. Amodal theorists 
argue that concepts are represented in an amodal symbolic 
semantic system detached from the sensory and motor systems, 
whereas supporters of the grounded accounts of knowledge 
claim that concepts are represented in several different 
modality-specific brain areas.  
In Part 1 of this dissertation I illustrate each view in detail and 
then discuss viable hybrid models of knowledge that combine 
aspects of both classes of theories. Part 2 is entirely devoted to 
testing predictions coming from amodal and grounded accounts 
of knowledge. Specifically, it is aimed at verifying the scope of 
the assumption that modality-specific representations underlie 
concepts and conceptual processing through the investigation of 
                                                          
1 The example was taken from Machery (2016). 
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the Modality-Switch Effect, a cost for performance in terms of 
speed and accuracy occurring when two different sensory 
modality properties for concepts alternate (e.g., leaves rustle - 
diamond glistens) compared to when the same sensory modality 
properties are being presented (e.g., leaves rustle – bee buzzes).  
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I. Amodal symbolic accounts of knowledge 
According to amodal symbolic accounts of knowledge, the 
mind is a symbol system and cognition is symbols manipulation. 
Semantic and conceptual2 processes are being attributed to a 
dedicated symbolic level, also known as the mental level (i.e., 
the mind), that is a rule-governed functional level independent 
of the physical substrate through which it realizes its functions. 
Such an autonomous symbolic level would thus be functionally 
detached from sensory and motor systems. In order to be 
manipulated, sensory and motor information coming from the 
environment would need to be transduced into a different format 
that is symbolic, amodal, and arbitrary.  
1. The symbolic model of mind. The symbolic model of mind, 
also known as the representational or computational theory3 of 
mind (Fodor, 1975; 1987; Newell, 1980; Pylyshyn, 1980, 1984) 
describes the mind as being a symbol system or a system of 
representation. Such a system is characterized by a set of 
arbitrary physical tokens manipulated on the basis of explicit 
rules. Phisical tokens can be atomic symbol tokens (e.g., ravens) 
or composite symbol-tokens strings (e.g., feathered ravens). 
                                                          
2 Much of the literature use the terms “semantic” and “conceptual” as 
synonyms. I do the same here, though it is worth mentioning that Murphy 
(2002, p. 385) proposes an interesting view on the relation between meanings 
and concepts known as the conceptual view. On this view, a word gets its 
significance by being connected to a concept. In other words, the meaning is 
built out of concepts. 
3 It is worth noting that while a “theory” attempts to explain phenomena, for 
example suggesting the mechanisms involved, a “model” is aimed at 
representing phenomena, for example describing the components and 
operations involved.  
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These symbols are manipulated on the basis of their shape4 (not 
their meaning). Symbols or representations of the system have a 
combinatorial syntax and semantics. That is, structurally 
complex (molecular) representations are systematically built up 
out of structurally simple (atomic) constituents, and the semantic 
content of a complex representation is a function of the semantic 
content of its atomic constituents together with their mode of 
combination (see also Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). The symbol 
system and all its parts are semantically interpretable, namely 
the syntax can be systematically assigned a meaning, for 
example as describing states of affairs (e.g., John loves Mary).  
Most of the arguments supporting the representational theory 
of mind derive their strength from their ability to explain certain 
empirical phenomena such as the productivity and systematicity 
of thought and thinking. Productivity refers to the ability of 
building and understanding a potentially infinite number of 
linguistic expressions starting from a finite number of linguistic 
elements. Systematicity refers to the ability of building and 
understanding recurring defined and predictable patterns such as 
John loves Mary - Mary loves John.  
For the purposes of the debate on the format of concepts, it is 
worth emphasizing that symbols in a symbol system are 
conceived as amodal, that is, they are inherently nonperceptual. 
Amodal symbolic semantic systems assume that cognitive and 
                                                          
4 For this reason, symbol systems are formal systems. Formalisms such as 
predicate calculus, probability theory, and programming languages inspired 
many new representational languages in cognitive science (e.g., feature lists, 
frames, schemata, connectionism, etc.) as we shall see later in this chapter. 
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perceptual information constitute separate systems that work 
following different rules and use different representational 
formats. Figure 1 illustrates this assumption. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 The basic assumption underlying amodal symbol systems is that 
perceptual information is transduced into a new representational format that 
is completely amodal. As a result, the internal structure of these symbols is 
unrelated to the perceptual information that produced them and arbitrary, 
conventional associations establish reference. 
Reference: Barsalou [1999] 
 
Perceptual information coming from the environment is 
captured by sensory-motor systems and transduced into a 
completely new representation language that is inherently 
nonperceptual: the amodal system. Amodal symbols would 
become organized into larger representational structures, such as 
feature lists (Smith and Medin, 1981; Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 
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1974), frames (Barsalou & Hale, 1993), semantic networks 
(Collins & Loftus, 1975; Collins & Quillian, 1969), etc.. Each of 
these structures constitute a fully functional symbolic system 
with a combinatorial syntax and semantics that supports all of 
the higher cognitive functions, including memory, knowledge, 
language, and thought. Symbols in these systems are amodal 
because they do not correspond to the perceptual states that 
produced them. The amodal symbols that represent the colors of 
objects, for example, would be located in a completely different 
neural system from the one designated for perception of colors.  
As a consequence of being amodal, symbols in a symbol 
system are arbitrarily linked to perceptual information. As 
Barsalou (1999, pp. 578-579) explains: “Similarly to how words 
typically have arbitrary relations to entities in the world, amodal 
symbols have arbitrary relations to perceptual states. Just as the 
word “chair” has no systematic similarity to physical chairs, the 
amodal symbol for chair has no systematic similarity to 
perceived chairs”. 
Amodal symbols are usually represented as linguistic forms. 
In feature lists (e.g., Smith et al., 1974), words represent 
features. For example, for the concept bird, the words paw, 
beak, feathers, wings, tail, etc. represent its features. Similarly, 
relations, arguments, and values are represented as words in 
frames (Barsalou & Hale, 1993). For example, the relation kick 
involves an agent whose argument might be the word kid and an 
object whose argument might be the word ball. Although being 
usually represented as linguistic forms, amodal symbols’ content 
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are not words. Rather, it is assumed that close amodal 
counterparts of words constitute the content of amodal symbols. 
However, as Barsalou (1999, p. 579) points out, “symbolic 
thought is assumed to be analogous in many important ways to 
language”. 
Neuropsychological studies have shown results supporting the 
amodal format of concepts. In Semantic Dementia (SD), a 
neurodegenerative condition, a brain damage in the temporal 
pole and adjacent areas results in an impairment of conceptual 
processing (Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007). Patients with 
SD show “a progressive deterioration of expressive and 
receptive vocabulary and of knowledge about the properties of 
everyday objects” (Patterson et al., 2007, p. 978). Degraded 
knowledge extends across all conceptual domains (including 
animal, tools etc.) and conceptual modalities (e.g., visual, 
auditory, action-related etc.). Interestingly, it has been shown 
that atypical instances of a category are more impaired than 
typical ones (Rogers, Lambon Ralph, Garrad, Bozeat, 
McClelland, Hodges, & Patterson, 2004). Thus, for example, 
knowledge of penguins or ducks is more degraded than 
knowledge of sparrows or robins, the latter being more typical 
instances of the category birds than the former. It is important to 
point out that while typical instances of a category tend to share 
many properties with other exemplars of the same category, 
atypical instances have just few properties in common with 
other category members. For example, typical instances of birds 
such as sparrow and robin share many properties such as 
 11 
 
feathers, nest in trees, and feed on the ground. By contrast, 
atypical instances of birds such as penguins have idiosyncratic 
and distinguishing properties such as being flightless and 
aquatic. Rogers et al. (2004) pointed out that as damage 
accumulates, the system becomes increasingly unable to retrieve 
idiosyncratic and distinguishing information about objects 
because distinctive properties of individual items are not shared 
by other category members. Thus, while it is likely that small 
distortion of the penguin representation will prevent the retrieval 
of the penguin’s specific name or, more generally, to identify a 
certain entity as a penguin, small distortion of the robin 
representation could still allow to retrieve the robin’s name or to 
identify a certain entity as a robin given that many of its 
properties are shared by other category members. If one of these 
property is damaged, other properties of the concept’s schema 
can help retrieve it, or stand in for it. Sharing a high number of 
properties ensures a considerable bundle of relations between 
concepts. Relations among concepts belonging to the same 
category ensure that semantically related items (for example, 
various different birds) are coded with similar patterns across 
neurons. Therefore, the more pronounced impairment for 
atypical rather than typical instances of a category would 
suggest a sensitivity of SD to abstract relations between 
concepts (Rogers et al., 2004; Patterson et al., 2007). Abstract 
relations or semantic generalizations are believed to require a 
single amodal hub that would be located in the anterior temporal 
lobe (ATL). Indeed, early symptomps of SD seem to emerge in 
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conjunction with lesions in the temporal poles. In addition, ATL 
has been shown to be functionally relevant for conceptual 
processing in healthy people: transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) of anterior temporal areas brought about a deteriorated 
performance in semantic tasks for pictures and words similar to 
the impairment seen in SD (Pobric, Jefferies, & Lambon Ralph, 
2010).  
In sum, Semantic Dementia has been shown to be sensitive to 
structural relations between concepts. Relational knowledge is 
best explained throught the existence of a single amodal hub. It 
has been proposed that areas within the anterior temporal cortex 
are the neural substrate of an amodal conceptual system 
(Patterson et al., 2007; McClelland & Rogers, 2003; Rogers et 
al., 2004). I will discuss this issue further in chapter III when 
presenting hybrid models of cognition. 
I will now turn to discuss an important distinction within 
amodal symbolic systems: the local versus distributed 
distinction. 
2. Localist versus distributed systems. According to a localist 
amodal account of conceptual representations, concepts are 
represented as nodes in a semantic network (Collins & Loftus, 
1975; Collins & Quillian, 1969). Figure 2 depicts a schematic 
illustration of such a network.  
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Fig. 2 A schematic representation of concepts in a semantic network (shorter 
line represents greater relatedness between concepts). 
Reference: Collins & Loftus [1975] 
 
Each node is related to a number of other nodes in the network 
on the basis of different types of relations (taxonomic: e.g., car-
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vechicles; perceptual: e.g., apples-red; thematic or situational: 
e.g., car-street).  
The localist view on concepts implies that the organization of 
conceptual knowledge in our minds reflects statistical 
information available in the environment. The network of 
interconnected nodes can be conceived as a large 
representational structure that provides propositional knowledge 
about a concept (e.g., that apples are red) in an explicit symbolic 
fashion. To illustrate, each node is identified by a label (i.e., a 
word) which is arbitrarily related to a specific content. Each 
concept is a specific node, which is distinct at both the 
neuroanatomical and the functional level from sensory and 
motor representations.  
Neuroanatomically speaking, localist views of conceptual 
knowledge assume that concepts are single neuronal units 
(Barlow, 1972).  Such grandmother cell5 assumption, found 
support from recent work in neuropsychology. Studies using 
single cell recordings in patients found neurons firing in a highly 
specific manner to single objects, faces, words or persons, 
suggesting an at least plausible localist coding of information by 
grandmother cells (for a review see Bowers, 2009). Neurons in 
the lateral temporal lobe preferentially fired when single, 
specific words were presented (Creutzfeldt, Ojemann, & Lettich, 
1989) although it is still not very clear whether neural responses 
                                                          
5 The label “grandmother cell” designates a hypothetical neuron that 
represents a complex but specific concept or object that activates when a 
person sees, hears, or otherwise sensibly discriminates a specific entity such 
as his or her grandmother, that is where the label comes from. 
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were driven by perceptual or conceptual variables (see Kiefer & 
Pulvermüller, 2012). Similarly, neurons in the medial temporal 
lobe were selectively activated by highly different pictures of a 
given person, landmark or object and in some cases even by 
person names6 (Quiroga, Reddy, Kreiman, Koch, & Fried, 
2005). Although such data seem quite consistent with the 
grandmother cell assumption, Kiefer and Pulvermüller (2012, p. 
813) pointed out that in the above mentioned-study “the 
specificity or the individual cells’ response patterns to stimulus 
type can only be compared to a relatively small number of 
control stimuli and comparison cells, so that the bold statement 
of absolute specificity can never be supported convincingly”. 
Although localist concepts are largely meant to be single 
neuronal units, localist representations do not necessarily imply 
a one-neuron-one-concept correspondence. On the contrary they 
may consist of larger neurons populations (Bowers, 2009). For 
example, it has been argued that a cell assembly can act as one 
single functional unit, it can have an activation threshold, and it 
can be activated as a whole when this threshold is reached 
(Garagnani, Wennekers, & Pulvermüller, 2008; Wennekers, 
Garagnani, & Pulvermüller, 2006). The cell assembly 
assumption allows to keep the critical aspects of localist models 
unchanged in the context of distributed neural networks. 
                                                          
6 For instance, one neuron fired not only when a range of quite different 
pictures of Halle Barry’s face were shown, but also to her written name, 
while it did not fire when other different stimuli were shown (Quiroga et al., 
2005). 
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Feature list models (e.g., Smith et al., 1974) can be considered 
as an early example of distributed theories. In feature list 
models, a concept consists of a set of semantic features that code 
its basic different characteristics in an explicit fashion. For 
instance, the concept apple is constituted by the features red, 
round, smooth, juicy, sweet, has stalk, and so on. Subsequent 
models based on distributed theories such as the parallel 
distributed processing (PDP) or connectionist framework of 
cognition (see Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986), conceived 
concepts as dynamic patterns of activity in a multilayered 
network of units with weighted positive and negative 
interconnections (see also McClelland & Rogers, 2003; Tyler & 
Moss, 2001). Thus, in these models conceptual knowledge is not 
explicitly represented in form of symbolic features or single 
nodes. Rather, it is represented as propagation of activation 
among connected processing units in the network. The 
connection weights or strengths between the processing units 
within the network are learned through exposure and feedback, 
that is, they are shaped by experience and adjusted according to 
new inputs through a mechanism of backpropagation.  
Both feature list and distributed network models assume that 
conceptual knowledge is represented in an amodal format within 
a unitary conceptual system that stores all kind of information 
independently of knowledge modality (e.g., visual, auditory, 
action-related, etc.) or category (e.g., animals or tools). Such a 
unitary conceptual system is assumed to be distinct from the 
perception and action brain systems. However, it is worth noting 
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that feature list and PDP models can also work in the context of 
modality-specific conceptual representations as shown by a 
number of studies (Farah & McClelland, 1991; Plaut, 2002; 
Pulvermüller, 1999; Simmons & Barsalou, 2003; Vigliocco, 
Vinson, Lewis, & Garrett, 2004) some of which will be 
discussed in chapter III. 
Support for distributed systems comes from empirical 
evidence. The pattern of deficits in neurogenerative diseases 
such as Semantic Dementia (SD) and Alzheimer Disease (AD) 
can be much better accounted for by distributed than local 
representations at both the functional and neuroanatomical level. 
For instance, in SD knowledge of a single concept is not entirely 
impaired as would be predicted by a grandmother cell 
hypothesis. On the contrary, what has been observed is a 
progressive degradation of knowledge beginning with specific 
properties of an object concept (e.g., doves are white) that 
spreads to more general central properties shared by many 
exemplars (e.g., doves have wings; Rogers et al., 2004). 
Similarly, superordinate information (e.g., canary is an animal) 
is typically relatively preserved in SD, whereas more specific 
conceptual information (e.g., canary is a bird) suffers from a 
more severe impairment (Hodges, Graham, & Patterson, 1995; 
Rogers et al., 2004).  
Moreover, neurophysiological studies show that many 
different parts of the brain are involved during conceptual tasks 
(e.g., Martin, 2007; Pulvermüller, Lutzenberger, & Preissl, 
2009; Kiefer, Sim, Hernberger, Grothe, Hoenig, 2008) 
 18 
 
suggesting a distributed system is more plausible. In addition, it 
has been observed that the activation pattern in sensory and 
motor areas varies as a function of the task context (Hoenig, 
Sim, Bochev, Hernberger, & Kiefer, 2008). Further evidence 
coming from behavioral studies confirm this result (Barclay, 
Bransford, Franks, MCCarrell, Nitsch, 1974; Barsalou, 1982) as 
we shall see in the next section.  
3. Stable versus flexible representations. The main and most 
important difference between localist and distributed views of 
concepts is conceptual flexibility (for a recent review see Yee & 
Thompson-Schill, 2016). That is, while localist concepts are 
conceived as stable mental knowledge entities that are 
situationally invariant, distributed views allows for the 
contribution of different units to the same concept. Moreover, 
different units are differently activated as a function of the 
context in which the concept is processed. For example, while 
on the localist view the meaning of apple is assumed to be the 
same across contexts, on the distributed view the same meaning 
is assumed to vary whether the apple is peeled or unpeeled, ripe 
or unripe, painted or cooked, etc..  
As pointed out by Kiefer and Pulvermüller (2012, p. 807), “the 
stable-flexible distinction has its roots in modern analytical 
philosophy and linguistics”. Theoretical positions focusing on 
normative aspects of meaning were concerned on whether words 
carry a core meaning, that is, a stable concept which is 
invariantly accessed each time the word is used. Processing of a 
particular concept would then be performed by an invariant 
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pattern of activated brain areas irrespective of task demands. 
However, words such as game clearly shows that this cannot be 
so. Under the label game a number of instances is encompassed 
that do not share a fixed set of conceptual features. For example, 
chess, video games, football are all very different games. 
However, they are associated because of family resemblance. 
Wittgenstein (1953) pointed out that the various games relate to 
each other as the members of a big family do7, with some pairs 
exhibiting great similarities (e.g., football-volleyball) while 
others varying considerably (e.g., football-chess).  
A different yet relevant phenomenon for the stable-flexible 
distinction is lexical ambiguity. Context can affect the way in 
which an ambiguous word is encoded. Consider the word jam. 
In the compound strawberry jam it indicates the fruit conserve 
and it is thus related to the semantic domain of food, whereas in 
the compound traffic jam it indicates the vehicle congestion and 
it is thus related to the semantic domain of vehicles. 
By focusing on relatively invariant features of words, 
normative theories of meaning also neglected the variability 
inherent in a word’s interpretation. Indeed, uses and meanings of 
words are manifold. Under different circumstances, the same 
word can be interpreted very differently. Consider, for example, 
the way in which one’s interpretation of the unambiguous word 
piano is affected by verb selection in the following five 
sentences: the man lifted the piano; the man tuned the piano; the 
man smashed the piano; the man sat on the piano; the man 
                                                          
7 For this reason he calls such relationship “family resemblance”. 
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photographed the piano (Barclay et al. 1974). Different 
properties of piano are differently emphasized as a function of 
the event described in each sentence.  
The phenomena of family resemblance, lexical ambiguity and 
variability of the word’s interpretation can be best explained by 
distributed theories assuming conceptual flexibility. According 
to such theories, concepts (i.e., word meanings) are constituted 
of dynamically recruited features depending on the context 
(Barsalou, 1982; Kiefer, 2005). The activation of features 
contributing to a concept differs on the basis of weighting 
mechanisms and of contextual constraints. By weighting 
mechanisms is meant the contextually determined relevance of a 
word’s semantic properties. For example, given the event lifting 
the heaviness of a piano is relevant, while the sound it can make 
is not. By contextual constraint is meant the interaction between 
linguistic knowledge and more general world knowledge. For 
instance, if one knows that a piano is being smashed then he also 
knows that no one will be able to play that piano before it will 
be fixed.  
Behavioral literature shows that the contribution of features to 
a concept are context dependent. Barclay et al., (1974) produced 
evidence that the interpretation of familiar, unambiguous words 
varied with their sentential contexts. Cues mentioning some 
property of the target word's referent (e.g., piano) induced a 
better recall when the information they expressed was relevant 
(e.g., something heavy), rather than irrelevant (e.g., something 
with a nice sound), to the events described by previously shown 
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sentences (e.g., the man lifted the piano). They replicated their 
result in a series of subsequent experiments with different 
experimental settings and materials. 
Barsalou (1982, Experiment 1) demonstrated that the speed of 
property verification was affected by the context for some 
properties but not for others. Specifically, context-independent 
properties are those shared by common categories such as birds, 
furniture, vegetables. For example, the concepts sparrow and 
robin share the common property of flight. Shared properties of 
common categories were shown to be equally activated with and 
without a given context. On the contrary, context-dependent 
properties are those shared by ad hoc categories such as things 
that float, things that have a smell, things that can be thrown. 
For example, the concepts basketball and log share the common 
property of floating. Shared properties of ad hoc categories were 
shown to be normally inactive and got activated only when there 
was an available context. Barsalou (1982, Experiment 2) also 
showed that the similarity of two concepts was not rated as 
increased by presenting a context relevant to common 
categories, whereas the same measure increased when 
presenting a context relevant to ad hoc categories. For example, 
the similarity of the pair of concepts robin-eagle did not 
increase when the context word was birds, while the similarity 
of the pair record album-necklace did increase when the context 
was possible gifts.  
The notion of flexible concepts was further tested in a 
combined functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and 
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event-related potentials (ERP) study (Hoenig et al., 2008). 
Participants performed verifications of two property types (i.e., 
visual, action-related) for words referring to different categories, 
namely artefacts and natural objects. Functional imaging 
predominantly revealed cross-over interactions between 
category and property type in visual, motor and motion-related 
brain areas indicating that access to conceptual knowledge is 
strongly influenced by the type of property (visual, action-
related). Activation in these modality-specific brain areas was 
increased when non-dominant conceptual features (i.e., visual 
features for artefacts and action-related features for natural 
kinds) had to be verified. ERPs in turn indicated that these 
cross-over interactions between category and property type 
emerged as early as 116 msec after stimulus onset suggesting 
that they reflect rapid access to conceptual features rather than 
post-conceptual processing. These results foster the hypothesis 
that concepts are flexible mental entities. Following this 
evidence, concepts and corresponding word meanings as well as 
their neurobiological underpinnings should therefore be viewed 
as context-dependent. Therefore, the use of a concept in 
different situations can be modeled as the context-specific firing 
of cell assemblies, which is constrained by both established 
connections between neurons that constitute conceptual long-
term memory traces and the context-dependent influence, which 
primes different sets of neural populations (Hoenig et al., 2008; 
Kiefer, 2005; Pulvermüller, 1999).  
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In sum, concepts consist of semantic features which are 
recruited from distributed, yet localized semantic maps in 
modality-specific brain regions depending on contextual 
constraints. I will focus on modality specific brain activation 
and its interpretation in chapter II while I will now introduce the 
main problems affecting amodal symbolic accounts of 
knowledge. 
4. The symbol grounding problem. In a pure symbolic model 
the crucial connection between the symbols and their referents is 
missing. In other words, an autonomous symbol system is 
ungrounded. This is known as the symbol grounding problem. 
The symbol grounding problem (Searle, 1980; Harnad, 1990) 
refers to how amodal symbols would be mapped to perceptual 
states and entities in the world. Two examples will help us 
understand the problem. The first is Searle's "Chinese room 
argument", in which the symbol grounding problem is referred 
to as the problem of intrinsic meaning or "intentionality". 
According to the computational theory of mind (Fodor, 1975; 
1987; Newell, 1980; Pylyshyn, 1980, 1984), if a computer could 
respond to all Chinese symbol strings it receives as input with 
Chinese symbol strings that are indistinguishable from the 
replies a real Chinese speaker would make (i.e., pass the Turing 
test in Chinese; see Turing, 1964) - then the computer would 
understand the meaning of Chinese symbols in the same sense 
that English people understand the meaning of English words. In 
response to this argument, Searle (1980) pointed out that 
imagining himself, who knows no Chinese, doing what the 
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computer does (i.e., receiving the Chinese input symbols, 
manipulating them purely on the basis of their shape, and finally 
returning the Chinese output symbols) would not be 
understanding Chinese. Hence, neither the computer could 
actually understand Chinese. He argues that unlike words in our 
head which have intrinsic meaning, symbols in a symbol system 
have extrinsic meaning. That is, if we compare these symbols to 
the words in a book we can easily see how their meanings derive 
from the meanings in our head. Therefore, if the meanings of 
symbols in a symbol system are extrinsic, rather than intrinsic 
like the meanings in our heads, then they are not a viable model 
for the meanings in our heads. In other words, cognition cannot 
be just symbol manipulation.  
Harnad’s (1990) version of the symbol grounding problem is 
known as the “Chinese/Chinese dictionary-go-round”. He 
supposes to learn Chinese as a second language with a 
Chinese/Chinese dictionary as the only source of information. 
This would entail an endlessly transition from one meaningless 
symbol or symbol-string (i.e., the definiens) to another (i.e., the 
definiendum), without understanding what anything means. 
Figure 3 depicts an example of a Chinese dictionary entry. 
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Fig. 3 Chinese dictionary entry for "zebra", which is "striped horse". 
Reference: Harnad [1990] 
 
Harnad (1990) pointed out that unlike cryptologists of ancient 
languages and secret codes whose successful efforts are 
grounded in a first language and in real world experience and 
knowledge, the task faced by a purely symbolic model of the 
mind can never be accomplished. A symbolic model of mind 
can never get off the symbol/symbol merry-go-round because 
symbol meaning is not grounded in something other than just 
more meaningless symbols. 
The converse of the symbol grounding problem is the 
transduction problem, namely how amodal symbols arise in the 
cognitive system or, in other words, how perceptual states are 
mapped into amodal symbols. 
As we shall see in the next chapter, these shortcomings can be 
overcome assuming a different format for symbols, that is, a 
sensory-motor or perceptual format. 
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II. Grounded Accounts of Knowledge 
The grounded accounts of knowledge (also referred to as 
grounded cognition, situated cognition and embodied cognition 
hypothesis) are a class of psychological theories aimed at 
tackling the grounding problem raised initially by Searle (1980) 
and Harnad (1990). As we saw earlier, the grounding problem 
concerns the way in which amodal symbols, specifically, and 
cognition, more generally, are linked to the modalities, the body, 
and the environment. Thus, rather than studying cognitive 
mechanisms in isolation, grounded theories foster the study of 
cognitive mechanisms’ relations with the contexts in which they 
are embedded and on which they depend.  
According to Barsalou (2016, p. 1123), the label “grounded” 
better describes “the central focus of the general perspective by 
including other forms of grounding beside embodiment, such as 
multimodal simulation, physical situations, and social 
situations” (see also Barsalou 2008, 2010; Kiefer & Barsalou, 
2013). Indeed, the cornerstone of the grounded approach is to 
understand not only how the body contribute to cognition but 
also how the modalities, the physical environment, and the 
social environment contribute to it (Barsalou, Breazeal, & 
Smith, 2007).  
The theories of grounded cognition range from perceptual 
theories of concepts (Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008, 2016; Prinz, 
2002) to cognitive linguistics theories (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 
1999; Gibbs, 1994) to theories of situated action (Breazeal, 
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2002; Clark 1997; Gibson, 1979; Prinz, 1997; Steels & Brooks, 
1995; Thelen & L. Smith 1994), memory (Conway, 1990, 2002; 
Glenberg, 1997, 2015a, 2015b; Rubin, 2006) and social 
simulation (Arbib, 2005; Decety & Grèzes 2006; Gallese, 
Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; Goldman, 2006; Rizzolatti & 
Arbib, 1998; Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004; for other proposals 
within the grounded or embodied framework, see Gallese & 
Lakoff, 2005; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Kiefer & 
Pulvermüller, 2011; Martin, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 2000; 
Pulvermüller, 2005, 2013; Zwaan, 2004, 2016). For the purposes 
of the present manuscript, I focus on perceptual theories of 
concepts, all other theories being beyond the scope of this 
research.  
1. An antecedent: The sensory/functional theory. 
Neuropsychological research has shown selective impairments 
at the expense of specific categories of information. That is, 
following a stroke, a viral infection or a neurodegenerative 
disease such as the Alzheimer disease (AD) or Semantic 
Dementia (SD), people may lose knowledge of some categories 
while retaining knowledge of others. For example, people may 
selectively lose knowledge of living animate entities (i.e., 
animals), living inanimate entities (i.e., fruit/vegetables), 
conspecifics (i.e., other people), or nonliving things (i.e., 
vechicles). There are various different patterns of category-
specific deficits8. Patients lose knowledge of living things, in 
                                                          
8  Category-specific deficits are aslo known as “agnosia” or “semantic 
deficits”. Whereas the term “agnosia” implies that the deficit reflects damage 
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particular animals more often than nonliving things, such as 
manipulable artefacts. Sometimes patients lose knowledge of a 
single category, sometimes of multiple categories.  
Warrington and her collaborators (Warrington & McCarthy, 
1983, 1987; Warrington & Shallice, 1984) put forward a 
proposal to explain category-specific deficits that has had a 
broad impact on theoretical accounts of the organization and 
representation of concepts in the brain. The sensory/functional 
theory (Warrington & McCarthy, 1983, 1987; Warrington & 
Shallice, 1984; see also Damasio, 1989; Farah & McClelland 
1991; Humphreys and Forde, 2001; McRae & Cree’s, 2002) 
assumes that knowledge of a specific category is located near 
the sensory-motor areas of the brain dedicated to the perception 
of its instances’ perceptual qualities and kind of movements. As 
a consequence, when a sensory-motor area is damaged, the 
processing of instances of the specif category (or categories) that 
rely on that area is impaired. Therefore, a damage to modality-
specific brain systems explains category-specific deficits. 
According to these researchers there are high correlations 
between certain categories and certain modality-specific 
systems. Specifically, they suggested that living things such as 
animals and fruits/vegetables mainly depend on visual 
perceptual properties for their identification, whereas nonliving 
things such as vechicles or tools mainly depend on 
                                                                                                                             
to a particular sensory-motor modality, the label “semantic deficit” implies 
damage to a higher-order conceptual representation. Particular theories tend 
to favour one term over the other, based on their particular assumptions about 
the conceptual system. 
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functional/associative properties for their identification. Further 
studies along these lines (Borgo & Shallice, 2001; 2003; Cree & 
McRae, 2003; Crutch & Warrington, 2003; Vinson, Vigliocco, 
Cappa, & Siri, 2003) have emphasized the importance of 
different visual properties for different categories. For example, 
while the recognition of living things such as animals mainly 
depends on the visual property of motion, the recognition of 
living things such as fruits mainly depends on the visual 
property of color. 
In addition, much recent neuroimaging research has largely 
shown different neural activations for different categories. For 
instance, Chao, Haxby, and Martin (1999) and Chao, Weisberg, 
and Martin (2002) found differential activation for animals and 
tools. Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun (1997) showed neural 
specificity for faces. Further investigations have demonstrated 
the activation of specific neural areas when specific stimuli such 
as places (Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998; see also Bar & Aminoff, 
2003), bodyparts (e.g., Downing, Jiang, Shuman, & Anwisher, 
2001), and written words (e.g., Cohen, Dehaene, Naccache, 
Lehéricy, Dehaene-Lambertz, Hénaff, & Michel 2000; Glezer, 
Jiang, & Riesenhuber, 2009) were presented. Chao & Martin 
(2000) described regions in the dorsal visual pathway, such as 
posterior parietal cortex, that were differentially recruited when 
participants viewed manipulable objects such as tools and 
utensils. Also, semantic knowledge of actions involves different 
loci of representation in the brain than semantic knowledge of 
entities, specifically the frontal lobe motor-related areas (see, for 
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example, Hickok, 2014; Kemmerer, 2015). This substantial 
amount of data corroborated the idea that semantic category or 
domain is an organizing principle in the brain.  
The sensory/functional theory assumes the existence of a 
sensory store that contains conceptual content recoded from the 
original sensory systems. Similarly, a functional store is 
hypothesized that contains conceptual content recoded from the 
motor system. The assumption of multiple systems (sensory, 
functional) for the representation of knowledge lends the theory 
a distributed character, whereas the idea of a recoding or 
transduction of sensory-motor properties into new 
representations (which later function as stand-alone 
representations) is typical of the amodal accounts of knowledge. 
Despite being an amodal account of knowledge, the 
sensory/functional theory has proved crucial for the flourishing 
of grounded theories of knowledge, the latter sharing with the 
former the idea that categories, and the conceptual system more 
broadly, are organized in a modality-specific fashion.   
2. The convergence zone theory. A rather different formulation 
of the sensory/functional theory is the convergence zone theory 
(CZ, Damasio, 1989; Damasio & Damasio, 1994). The theory 
consists of two core components: (1) systems of feature 
detectors in sensory-motor areas, and (2) conjunctions of 
modality-specific and cross-modal information in convergence 
zones. On this view, when an entity is perceived, it activates 
feature detectors in the relevant sensory-motor areas (systems of 
these detectors are also known as “feature maps”, see Simmons 
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& Barsalou, 2003). During visual processing of a cat, for 
example, some neurons respond to line orientations, vertices, 
and planar surfaces. Others respond to colour, and direction of 
movement. The overall pattern of activation across this 
hierarchically organised distributed system constitutes the visual 
representation of the concept cat in the visual system (Palmer, 
1999; Zeki, 1993). Similar patterns of activation arise in other 
modalities (auditory, motor, etc.).  
The states (i.e., patterns of activation) that arise in different 
sensory-motor areas are then stored in association areas. 
Damasio refers to these association areas as “convergence 
zones” and assumes that they exist at multiple hierarchical 
levels, that is, sensory-motor (i.e., posterior in the brain) as well 
as higher-level (i.e., anterior in the brain). At the sensory-motor 
level, CZs store patterns of activation within a particular 
modality. For example, CZs near visual processing areas store 
patterns of activation within the visual system, whereas CZs 
near motor processing areas store patterns of activation within 
the motor system. Conversely, higher-level association areas 
link together patterns of activation across modalities. For 
example, if CZs near visual processing areas store the visual 
form of a chair and CZs near motor processing areas store the 
action taken on a chair then a subset of neurons in higher level 
cross-modal CZs correlates the visual form of the chair with the 
action taken on it. Thus, subsets of neurons in higher level cross-
modal CZs link together earlier conjunctions of neurons present 
in sensory-motor CZs.  
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It is assumed that convergence zones become differentially 
important for representing different semantic categories. For 
example, because humans frequently interact with tools and 
other man-made objects, the zone that links object shape and 
action might be more important for knowledge of artefacts than 
for knowledge of living things. Similarly, because animals move 
in characteristic ways, the zone that links shape to movement 
might acquire special salience for knowledge of animals. 
Unlike other sensory/functional theories, which assume that 
conceptual content only exists in other systems that recode 
patterns of feature maps activation, the convergence zone theory 
posits that conceptual content does only exist in feature maps. 
According to Damasio (1989) neurons in CZs play no 
representational roles. That is, they only constitute a means of 
reactivating previously active patterns in feature maps. Consider 
the representation of chairs, for example. Damasio assumes that 
neurons in CZs that link together the visual features of chairs 
cannot function as a stand-alone representation of this category. 
Rather these neurons serve to reactivate chair features in visual 
feature maps, which then constitute a conceptual representation 
of chairs. This is a radical different claim from other 
sensory/functional theories and from amodal accounts in 
general, which will shape subsequent theories of concepts and 
conceptual processing. Therefore, neurons in CZs play the 
important role of reactivating patterns in feature maps during 
imagery, conceptual processing, and other cognitive tasks (see 
also Barsalou, 1999). Neurons in a sensory-motor CZ, for 
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example, can reactivate the previously captured sensory-motor 
state in the absence of bottom-up sensory stimulation. For 
example, in a recall task or during conceptual processing, 
neurons in the sensory-motor CZs may re-enact the sensory-
motor states that were active while encoding a certain object. 
The basic idea of re-enactment is essentially the same as that of 
neural accounts of mental imagery (e.g., Farah, 2000; Grezes & 
Decety, 2001; Jeannerod, 1995; Kosslyn, 1994). However, while 
imagery typically restores more complete and vivid images, a 
re-enactment in memory, conceptualization, and comprehension 
is only a sketchy record of experience, as we shall see in the 
next section.  
3. The perceptual symbol systems theory. The theory of 
perceptual symbol systems (PSS, Barsalou, 1999; see also 
Barsalou 2008, 2016) is one of the most prominent theory of 
concepts within the grounded framework. PSS recovers the 
basic CZ architecture and shows how a fully functional 
conceptual system can be built upon it. On this view it is 
assumed that a concept is a perceptual symbol, namely “a record 
of the neural activation that arises during perception” (Barsalou, 
1999, p. 583). Therefore, concepts or perceptual symbols are 
conceived as the constituents of a symbol system that are 
grounded in perception9. Barsalou (1999) describes perceptual 
                                                          
9 Rather than referring only to the sensory modalities, “perception” here 
refers to any aspect of perceived experience including proprioception and 
introspection. 
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symbols as unconscious, componential, schematic, and flexible 
representations. I address each of these characteristics in turn. 
In PSS view, concepts, or perceptual symbols, result from 
something different than conscious subjective experience. They 
function unconsciously as patterns of neural activation, thus 
being an alternative to the mental images of classical empiricist 
theories. Defining a perceptual symbol as an unconscious neural 
representation has important consequences for the theory of 
PSS. Specifically, it implies that while the neurons for a 
particular shape of an object may be active in processing a 
certain concept such as chair, other neurons coding a particular 
orientation of that same object may be not. As a consequence, 
perceptual symbols are componential rather than holistic 
representations, that is, they can be built up from simple parts 
arranged hierarchically (see also Marr, 1982). This aspect is 
what mostly differentiates perceptual symbols from mental 
images. 
As exemplified in Figure 4, a perceptual symbol is a schematic 
record of a perceptual experience, namely it can abstract away 
from details of position, scale, metric, proportion and viewpoint 
(see also Prinz, 2002). In fact, attentional mechanisms shape 
perceptual symbols. As Barsalou (1999, p. 584) explains, “If a 
configuration of active neurons underlies a perceptual state, 
selective attention operates on this neural representation, 
isolating a subset of active neurons. If selective attention focuses 
on an object’s shape, the neurons representing this shape are 
selected, and a record of their activation is stored”. Therefore, 
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“the symbol formation process selects and stores a subset of the 
active neurons in a perceptual state”. For example, during a 
perceptual experience such as viewing a chair, selective 
attention may focus on a particular feature of that experience 
(e.g., the shape of the chair in order to recognise it as a chair). 
As a consequence, other features of the same perceptual 
experience such as the color, texture, and position of the chair, 
as well as the surrounding objects, would be filtered out, at least 
to a significant extent.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Subsets of activated neurons in sensory-motor systems are stored in 
long-term memory to function as symbols. As a consequence, their format is 
perceptual, and they are grounded in the sensory-motor states that produced 
them. 
Reference: Barsalou [1999] 
 
Moreover, because a perceptual symbol is assumed to be a 
pattern of neurons, its activation is flexibly adapted to the 
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context at hand. Therefore, in PSS theory perceptual symbols 
and thus concepts are conceived as flexible representations10. 
In sum, selective attention focuses on particular features of 
perceived experience on the basis of the context in which the 
experiencer is immersed, according to the immediate goals of 
the perceptual experience, etc., and stores records of aspects of 
that experience in long-term memory, which later function as 
symbols. Stored perceptual symbols allow recognition of objects 
on subsequent occasions, and can be modiﬁed and updated over 
time. Indeed, as we experience more objects of the same kind 
(i.e., more chairs), we reﬁne those symbols that we have already 
stored. To appropriately represent intervening changes within a 
category, collections of perceptual symbols must be grouped 
together. We group these symbols together on the basis of 
different principles (see Prinz, 2002). For instance, hierarchical 
symbols consist of different representations of simple parts 
coinstantiated in a single object. Also, perceptual symbols 
formed in different modalities may be grouped together on the 
basis of coinstantiation. If I hear a chirp as my canary flies back 
into his cage, I may store a record of that chirp along with the 
visual representation of the canary getting into the cage because 
the two are coinstantiated, that is, they co-occur. Moreover, 
objects might change as we are observing them. Think of an 
unpeeled and a peeled apple, for example. It is the same object, 
thus the perceptual symbols corresponding to the two states (i.e., 
                                                          
10 See chapter I, section 3 for more insight on the stable versus flexible 
representations distinction. 
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unpeeled and peeled) get grouped together. In addition, we often 
experience things that co-occur even though they are not 
physically bounded such as a dog and his bone or a toothbrush 
with toothpaste. Finally, we could store representations together 
because they match, namely they are quite similar. Think, for 
example, of two different dogs such as a collie and a wolf dog.  
A different type of principles on the basis of which we group 
representations together are the causal/explanatory principles, 
which have been emphasized by theory theorists (e.g., Murphy 
& Medin, 1985). Causal/explanatory links between 
representations are more challenging to accomodate in the 
context of perceptual representations. For example, how does 
one represent the fact that happiness is causally related to tail 
wagging? A complete answer to such questions is not yet 
available in the context of the grounded approach although Prinz 
(2002, p. 148) has argued that “the failure to see how certain 
properties can be perceptually represented is almost always a 
failure of imagination”. More compellingly, hybrid models of 
knowledge offer a concrete answer to this question, as it will be 
seen in chapter III.  
Once a group of linked perceptual symbols is stored in 
memory, they constitute a long-term memory network. The 
schematic symbol formation process can operate in any 
modality of perceived experience: from sight to audition, from 
touch to smell, and taste, as well as on proprioception and 
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introspection11. Thus, for example, visual symbols might 
originate in visual areas, auditory symbols in auditory areas, 
proprioceptive symbols in motor areas, and so forth.  
Evidence supporting the claim that perceptual symbols 
originate (and then become established) in all modes of 
perceived experience comes from neuroimaging studies. A 
growing number of neuroimaging studies show that modality-
specific brain areas are active during conceptual processing (for 
reviews, see Binder & Desai, 2011; Martin, 2001, 2007; Martin 
& Chao, 2001). For instance, when people process colour names 
(e.g., yellow), specific areas in the visual cortex become active 
(Simmons, Ramjee, Beauchamp, McRae, Martin, & Barsalou, 
2007). Conversely, when people process concepts for which the 
auditory modality is important (e.g., telephone) specific auditory 
areas become activated (Kiefer, Sim, Herrnberger, Grothe, & 
Hoenig, 2008). These results are consistent with the claim that 
perceptual symbols are multimodal, that is, they become 
established in all modalities of experience and they are 
distributed widely throughout the modality-specific areas of the 
brain.  
                                                          
11 The modality of proprioception is the one that allows oneself to perceive 
his own body in the space that surrounds it, and to perceive the strength 
employed in his own movements. From proprioceptive experience, for 
example, people derive concepts for hand movements and body positions. 
The modality of introspection is the one relative to the representation of an 
entity or event in its absence. It is also the one relative to cognitive operations 
such as rehearsal, elaboration, search, retrieval, comparison, and 
transformation, and to emotional states. From introspective experience, for 
example, people derive abstract concepts such as happiness, sadness, etc. 
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Further support in favor of the assumption that perceptual 
symbols become established in all modes of perceived 
experience comes from behavioral studies showing the 
involvement of sensorimotor systems during conceptual 
processing. As this literature is central to the second part of the 
present manuscript I will extensively illustrate it in Part 2. I will 
now focus on further theoretical support for the grounded 
accounts of knowledge. 
4. The principle of the neural reuse. It is widely known that 
evolution recycles existing mechanisms to perform new 
functions (Gould 1991; Gould & Vrba, 2008). As we saw in the 
previous section, Barsalou (1999, 2008, 2016) has argued that 
the same neural regions that are involved in perception and 
action are involved in conceptual processing. This mechanism, 
known as perceptual simulation, is of crucial importance in the 
context of grounded cognition. A perceptual simulation involves 
the reenactment of configurations of neurons previously 
established during our interaction with objects in the world. For 
instance, while processing the concept violin, the auditory 
system might re-enact states (i.e., patterns of neuronal 
activation) associated with hearing its sound.  
According to Barsalou (2016, p. 1130), the principle of 
“Neural reuse offers a natural account of what is meant by 
simulation”. Within the grounded framework, the reuse of 
neural circuitry for various cognitive purposes is assumed to be 
a central organizational principle that contribute to explain the 
functional structure of the brain. Specifically, grounded theories 
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argue that neural circuits established for one purpose (i.e., 
perception) are exapted or recycled during evolution or normal 
development, and are put to different uses (i.e., conception), 
often without losing their original functions.  
The principle of neural reuse can be summarized in three main 
points: a) neural circuits can continue to acquire new uses after 
an initial or original function is established; b) the acquisition of 
new uses need not involve unusual circumstances such as injury 
or loss of established function; 3) the acquisition of a new use 
need not involve (much) local change to circuit structure (e.g., it 
might involve only the establishment of functional connections 
to new neural partners; Anderson, 2010). 
Through the principle of neural reuse, and the mechanism of 
simulation, Barsalou explains how core cognitive functions such 
as the productivity of human thought and language could arise 
in the context of grounded cognition. As we saw earlier (chapter 
I, section 1), productivity is the ability to build and understand a 
potentially infinite number of linguistic expressions starting 
from a finite number of linguistic elements using combinatorial 
and recursive rules. In PSS it is shown how productivity is 
achieved through schematicity: “[…] if a perceptual symbol for 
ball only represents its shape schematically after color and 
texture have been filtered out, then information about color and 
texture can later be added productively. For example, the 
simulation of a ball could evolve into a blue ball or a smooth 
yellow ball. Because the symbol formation process similarly 
establishes schematic representations for colors and textures, 
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these representations can be combined productively with 
perceptual representations for shapes to produce complex 
simulations” (Barsalou, 1999, p. 593). In a nutshell, the 
principle of neural reuse further supports the mechanism of 
simulation through which stored schemas of aspects of 
experience are re-enacted and combined productively. 
According to Barsalou (2008, p. 632), although “Amodal 
formalisms for symbolic operations may provide a theoretical 
shorthand for expressing what the brain computes, […] 
simulation, or something else, may be the mechanism that 
actually implements these operations”. The fact that Barsalou 
suggests a way for PSS to be productive indicates that the 
transition from amodal symbolic accounts of knowledge to 
grounded theories of knowledge has not implied a replacement 
of more traditional views on concepts with more recent 
proposals. Rather, grounded theories have complemented more 
traditional ones developing their relations with the modalities, 
the body and the environment.  
In sum, according to grounded theories the existence of core 
cognitive functions such as the productivity of human language 
and thought is not in question. What is in question is how the 
brain may actually implement such core cognitive functions, that 
is, in an amodal format rather than in a sensory-motor format. 
Within the PSS framework, concepts have a sensory-motor 
format because conceptual content is, at least in part, reaccessed 
sensory-motor information. If the neural reuse hypothesis is 
correct, and conceptual processing exploits modality-specific 
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resources, then conceptual representations are more likely to 
have a modality-specific character rather than an amodal one. 
However, it is worth noting that although conceptual processing 
might often reuse systems that underly perception (and action 
and internal states), Barsalou (2016, p. 1129) acknowledges that 
conceptual processing might also “draw on integrative and 
abstractive mechanisms in association areas (Binder, 2016; 
Simmons & Barsalou, 2003)”. That is, conceptual processing 
might exploit other systems beyond the sensorimotor ones. It is 
to that we turn in chapter III. 
5. Is there a reductionist claim in grounded accounts? Critics 
of the grounded and embodied approach (Leshinskaya & 
Caramazza, 2016; Machery, 2016, Mahon, 2015; Mahon & 
Caramazza, 2008) argue that there is a reductionist claim within 
the grounded framework. The reductionist claim would consist 
in the assumption that sensory-motor mechanisms explain 
concepts and conceptual processing. Specifically, these authors 
disagree with the grounded claim that perceptual and motor 
information is constitutive of knowledge representation and 
language comprehension.  
For instance, Mahon & Caramazza (2008) argue against the 
interpretation of the activation of motor information when 
observing manipulable objects as evidence that motor 
information is constitutive of conceptual content (see Barsalou, 
Simmons, Barbey, & Wilson, 2003; Boulenger, Roy, Paulignan, 
Deprez, Jeannerod, & Nazir, 2006; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; 
Martin, 2007; Pulvermüller, 2005; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 
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2004). Indeed, these researchers pointed out that the activation 
of orthographic information during a phonological task has not 
led to draw the parallel inference that orthography of words is 
constitutive of their phonology. To illustrate, in a phonological 
task (e.g. rhyme judgment) orthographic information is activated 
(as demonstrated by priming effects) such that rhyme judgments 
are affected by orthographic similarity. For example, subjects 
are faster to decide that two words rhyme when they are 
ortographically similar (e.g., pie-tie) than when they are 
orthographically dissimilar (e.g., rye-tie; see Donnenwerth-
Nolan, Tanenhaus, & Seidenberg, 1981; Seidenberg & 
Tanenhaus, 1979; for a review see Muneaux & Ziegler, 2004). 
This result has not been interpreted as evidence that phonology 
is represented in terms of orthography. Rather, orthography is 
considered a separate type of information that is promiscuously 
available to the decision mechanisms. As pointed out by Desai 
(personal communication), in the context of a phonological task, 
the rapid activation of task-irrelevant information (i.e., 
orthography) could be due to a close correspondence between 
orthography, phonology, and semantics in language use. In 
reading, for example, orthography activates semantics and 
phonology, while in writing, semantics and phonology activate 
orthography. During reading, speaking, and listening, several 
words are processed per second, which makes rapid activation 
of this information essential. Thus, the triangle of orthography-
phonology-semantics is tightly connected such that activation in 
phonology activates orthography, which in turn feeds back to 
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phonology. This results from the fact that people have a vast 
amount of experience in reading and writing, which repeatedly 
reinforces the tight correspondence between orthography and 
phonology (and semantics). After all, as emphasized by Desai, 
learning to read and write is learning the orthography-phonology 
correspondence. Hence, according to Desai, it should be not 
surprising that performing a task that involves processing 
phonology but does not explicitly involve processing 
orthography leads to the activation of the latter as well without 
entailing that phonology is represented in terms of ortography.  
In addition, Mahon & Caramazza (2008) pointed out that 
neither the activation of phonological information during a 
naming task has led to draw the inference that the phonology of 
words is constitutive of their meaning. To illustrate, in a picture 
naming task, naming latencies were found to be faster in the 
phonologically related condition (hammock – hammer) than in 
the phonologically unrelated condition (hammock – button) 
(Morsella & Miozzo, 2002; Navarrete & Costa, 2005). That is, 
not just the name of the picture being named such as hammock 
was activated, but similar-sounding words such as hammer were 
also activated. According to Desai (personal communication), in 
this case, the rapid activation of task-irrelevant information (i.e., 
phonological) might be due to the fact that in a system where 
words (i.e., phonological, orthographic, or sematic forms of the 
word) have a distributed representation, a word activates one set 
of phonemes, which in turn activate other words with an 
overlapping set of phonemes (along with orthographic and 
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semantic codes). It is worth noting that activation simply does 
not spread everywhere. Rather, a specific word partially 
activates other specific, overlapping words. Hammock does not 
activate button even though button is part of the same overall 
system, and has the same distributed phonemic representation12. 
Thus, in this case, irrelevant activation is brought about by 
direct feature overlap, and, as in the previous example, is not 
arbitrary.  
In sum, these two examples demonstrate two ways in which 
task-irrelevant information might be activated. In one case, this 
is due to the actual real-life correspondence between two types 
of codes (orthography and phonology). In the other case, the 
activation of task-irrelevant information is due to the physical 
overlap of features in a distributed representation system. In 
neither case the activation of task-irrelevant information is 
arbitrary. 
Mahon & Caramazza (2008) further pointed out that in order 
to interpret the activation of motor information as conceptually 
relevant information one must first reject the alternative 
interpretation that the activation of the motor system is a merely 
by-product of the way in which activation spreads throughout 
the system. In particular, these researchers pointed out that a 
cascade processing model (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981) 
within the amodal symbolic accounts of knowledge is able to 
explain the phenomenon of motor activation when observing 
                                                          
12 Similarly, in semantics once a concept such as lion is activated, it causes 
some activation in concepts with overlapping features such as tiger.  
 46 
 
manipulable objects. However, assuming that the sensory-motor 
brain activations are a merely by-product or ‘Pavlovian’ reflex 
of conceptual/semantic processing implies that there must be an 
association between reading/hearing a word and doing an action, 
and vice versa. Specifically, when we perform a throwing action 
we use the word throw to describe it, thus an association is 
formed. On subsequently reading/hearing the word throw, the 
motor cortex is activated because of this Pavlovian association. 
However, it is worth noting that there is little to no association 
between doing or observing actions (or attending to objects) and 
using words denoting them. That is, language is not used as a 
running commentary of the immediate environment13. Rather, 
language is used to convey ideas that are not obvious to the 
listener/reader, and only much more rarely it is used to convey 
the details of the current physical environment that is available 
to and attended by the listener. For example, while sitting at the 
table eating lunch with a colleague we do not say “I’m sitting, 
I’m eating” and so on. However, this is what would be required 
for a Pavlovian association, that is, the co-occurrence of actions 
and relevant language expressing those actions.  
Using language as a commentary would not be possible 
mainly because of simultaneous occurrence of events and 
multiple possible levels of description. To illustrate, saying “I’m 
eating” while actually eating destroys the Pavlovian 
conditioning for “chewing”, and both of those hurt the 
                                                          
13 The counter-arguments that follows were all suggested by Rutvik Desai 
(personal communication). 
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conditioning of “talking” and “speaking” and “sitting”. We 
especially talk about past events, opinions, future plans or 
possibilities, implications, wishes, feelings, and so on, but only 
rarely we do talk about the immediate physical environment and 
actions that are obvious to our interlocutors. Even in the rare 
cases when we do describe our current actions, we do it if we 
think that it is not obvious or clear to the listener and hence 
needs to be emphasized. Otherwise, we do so for some 
rhetorical purpose such as sarcasm. For example, it is very 
common for authors of popular funny sitcoms to make people 
laugh this way. Even when the explicit task is to describe events, 
as required for a TV commentator of a soccer match for 
example, the obvious is left out. That is why soccer commentary 
on TV does not sound like “he kicks, he kicks, he runs, he kicks, 
he runs…”. On the other hand, one can and does read about all 
kinds of events without performing or observing of them. This 
does not imply that one cannot find examples where there is an 
actual correspondence between actions and words. For example, 
if we are in a park playing with a ball and our friends ask us to 
“throw the ball” we might actually throw the ball to them. 
However, such instances are very rare compared to the 
thousands of times that we may read or hear the verb throw 
without performing or observing the action in the immediate 
temporal vicinity. Secondly, if we throw the ball many times 
without using the word, then no learning occurs due to the few 
instances in which that did happen. Third, even if we hear our 
friends asking us to throw the ball and we do it, performing the 
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throwing action is not an automatic reflex. That is, it is not 
similar at all to orthography of a word activating the phonology 
of the word within 200 ms or so, without any decision-making. 
In the throwing situation, we consciously decide to follow 
through with a request, precisely because actually performing an 
action upon hearing an action word is a rare event.  
Now consider a different example. Imagine following 
instructions while assembling furniture. The instructions might 
say ‘put the screw into the hole’ and we might perform the 
action described. Again, this is a conscious decision involving 
temporal delay and decision-making, not a reflex action. There 
is no one-to-one correspondence between instructions and 
actions. Even the instructions do not describe in detail our actual 
actions, as the obvious is left out. The instructions might say 
‘tighten screws #5 and #6” but do not say ‘pick up the 
screwdriver, insert the head into the slot of the screw, hold the 
screwdriver firmly and turn your wrist clockwise, etc.”. Thus, 
not only actually following instructions constitutes a very small 
percentage of life and our total language use, it nevertheless is 
not nearly enough to establish Pavlovian conditioning. 
One may attempt to change the argument a bit and say that the 
conditioning is established during early childhood, when 
processing child-directed speech (CDS). The intuition is that 
CDS contains the type of correspondence required for Pavlovian 
conditioning. However, two problems might be raised. First, 
even if the conditioning were established in early childhood, it 
would be quickly eliminated once the child turns say 5-6 years 
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old and learns to read and parents and others stop 
communicating in a manner they do with babies or toddlers. An 
even bigger problem is that CDS is not a running commentary of 
the immediate environment either. This is the fundamental 
problem of language acquisition. Caregivers simply do not 
continuously describe the immediate actions and objects to the 
child. When a mother gets home, she might say “I am home!” or 
“Look who is home!”  But not “I am grasping the doorknob. I 
am turning the knob anticlockwise. I am pushing the door open. 
I am taking the first step in the house…”. That is why additional 
mechanism such as joint attention and statistical analysis need to 
be assumed in order to explain language acquisition. Therefore, 
the interpretation of task-irrelevant motor activation as a 
consequence of Pavlovian conditioning does not work. 
However, task-irrelevant activation could still be due to 
feature overlap as in the hammock – hammer example above. 
Activation of irrelevant phonological information during a 
naming task is due to the two words sharing a format 
(distributed set of phonemes), a network, and features. However, 
the fundamental claim of the amodal account is that concepts are 
represented as arbitrary amodal symbols that bear no 
resemblance to sensory-motor processes. An amodal symbol has 
an arbitrary form that has no similarity to, and contains no 
information in, the visual, auditory, or motor systems. Just as the 
word cup has no similarity to what a cup looks like or how it is 
used or what it feels like to use it. Thus, by definition, there 
cannot possibly be any overlap between an amodal concept and 
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the sensory-motor cortex. Unlike hammock that triggers partial 
activation of hammer, the abstract symbol for throw cannot 
spread anything to the motor cortex because they do not share 
anything. Hence, neither the Pavlovian conditioning nor 
overlapping features can explain rapid activation of sensory-
motor areas during conceptual tasks. There is only one 
possibility left. The activation in sensory-motor systems 
represents semantics itself as predicted by grounded accounts of 
knowledge. 
Finally, a more general point regarding the nature of Mahon & 
Caramazza’s (2008) argument. Most recent knowledge of 
human brain functions comes from ‘recording’ methods, such as 
fMRI, PET, EEG, MEG, ECoG, and NIRS, which are 
correlational by nature and do not show causality. If some 
researcher entertain principled belief regarding correlational 
methods showing unnecessary or irrelevant signals, then those 
researchers must necessarily dismiss all results from all these 
methods. If they are not willing to do that, then they should not 
bring up this possibility only when results go against their own 
theories. 
That being said, it is difficult to understand why grounded 
theories are accused of reductionism especially if, in addition to 
the above-mentioned arguments that fairly dismiss the skeptical 
hypothesis (Leshinskaya & Caramazza, 2016; Machery, 2016, 
Mahon, 2015; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008) against grounded 
accounts, one also consider that several theorists within the 
grounded and embodied framework agree that sensory-motor 
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mechanisms are insufficient in and of themselves for explaining 
concepts and conceptual processing. For example, Barsalou 
(2008) illustrates how both language and internal states 
contribute to the representation of concepts above and beyond 
the sensory-motor modalities. Also, Barsalou (1999) emphasizes 
that internal states play central roles in conceptual processing, 
especially for abstract concepts (see also Barsalou & Wiemer-
Hastings, 2005). As we saw earlier, Barsalou (2016) also 
suggests that conceptual processing might draw on integrative 
and abstractive mechanisms in association areas (see also 
Simmons & Barsalou, 2003). Similarly, Pulvermüller (2013) 
argues that disembodied mechanisms in the brain’s hub regions 
contribute to semantic meaning (see also Pulvermüller, 2012; 
Pulvermüller & Garagnani, 2014). In a seminal paper, 
Pulvermüller (2013) suggested the correlation learning 
principle, that is, a neural key to understand brain topographies 
of linguistic and semantic processes. In a nutshell, the core idea 
behind the principle is that “neurons that fire together wire 
together and neurons out of synk delink” (Pulvermüller, 2013 p. 
462). In order to explain why semantic brain processes have 
been observed within both sensory and motor areas and 
multimodal association cortices located far away from sensory 
and motor fields, Pulvermüller (2013, p. 464) suggested a key 
role for intermediary areas. “To link the spoken word form 
grasp to the concordant motor movement, or the articulation 
pattern for pronouncing the word grass to specific visual 
knowledge about color and shape, nerve cells in motor and 
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sensory areas are necessary; in addition, intermediary area 
neurons are equally required to build circuits that bind sensory 
and motor information. Neuroanatomical structure determines 
that the emerging circuits include neurons in modality-
nonspecific areas of cortex.” Therefore, if on the one hand 
modality-preferential areas are required to link symbols to 
information in the sensorimotor system, on the other hand, 
higher multimodal relay areas are recruited to bridge 
information coming from different modality-preferential 
systems (i.e., sensory and motor systems). In sum, the 
correlation learning principle together with the neuroanatomical 
structure (i.e., cortical connectivity) can explain why semantic 
processing is distributed over both modality-preferential and 
multimodal areas. I will further tackle these issues in the next 
chapter. 
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III. Hybrid accounts of knowledge 
What do a record album and a necklace have in common? Of 
course, not the sound, shape, colour, or actions their structures 
afford, let alone their names and verbal descriptions. Rather, as 
many of the readers will have already inferred, these objects 
share the property of being possible gifts. On this type of higher-
order generalizations that disregard modality-specific 
information about objects depends much of our conceptual 
processing. It is possible that different aspects of the same 
concept (e.g., what an object looks like versus whether or not it 
is of a certain type) are stored in different representational 
formats. To account for this fine-grained differences among 
conceptual representations, hybrid or pluralistic views have been 
put forward (e.g., Dove, 2009; Malt, 2010; Patterson et al., 
2007; Simmons & Barsalou, 2003). According to such views, 
some concepts (e.g., concrete nouns) are grounded in perceptual 
representations while others (e.g., abstract concepts) are amodal 
or “disembodied”. Malt (2010), for example, conceives 
relational or thematic representations as being amodal while 
other concepts as being perceptually grounded. Given the fact 
that lesions in some perceptual regions result in uni-modal, 
category-speciﬁc semantic deﬁcits (Kan et al., 2003) and lesions 
in the anterior temporal lobes (ATLs) result in multi-modal, 
category-general semantic deﬁcits (Patterson et al., 2007), it is at 
least possible that different neural substrates underly different 
concepts. In the remainder of this section I introduce and discuss 
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two different hybrid models of knowledge: the distributed-plus-
hub and conceptual topography proposals. 
1. The distributed-plus-hub view. According to the 
distributed-plus-hub view, sensory, motor and linguistic 
information is necessary but not sufficient to explain conceptual 
processing (Patterson et al., 2007; Lambon Ralph, Sage, Jones, 
Mayberry, 2010). On this view, in addition to direct 
neuroanatomical pathways between different sensory, motor and 
linguistic regions, the neural network for semantic memory 
requires a single convergence zone or hub that supports the 
interactive activation of representations in all modalities, for all 
semantic categories.  
Despite the assumption of the existence of a convergence 
zone, Patterson et al.’s proposal varies in at least two respects if 
compared to Damasio’s (1989) convergence zone theory. As we 
saw earlier, Damasio (1989) proposed the existence of 
convergence zones, namely association areas in the brain 
intended to associate different aspects of knowledge. According 
to Damasio, however, these association areas are assumed to be 
multiple, hierarchically organized convergence regions. For 
example, there is a cross-modal CZ that encode associations 
between visual representations of shape and corresponding 
actions, another that encodes associations between shape and 
object name, and so on. By contrast, the distributed-plus-hub 
view posits the existence of a single convergence zone or hub. 
Patterson et al.’s (2007) claim is that in addition to modality-
specific regions and connections, the various different surface 
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representations (i.e., shape) connect to and communicate 
through, a shared, amodal hub (shown as a red area in Fig. 5, 
Panel b) that would be located in the anterior temporal lobes.  
Furthermore, Damasio suggested that associations between 
different pairs of attributes are encoded along different 
neuroanatomical pathways. Thus, convergence zones become 
differentially important for representing different semantic 
categories. For example, because humans frequently interact 
with tools and other man-made objects, the zone that links 
object shape and action might be more important for knowledge 
of man-made artefacts than for knowledge of living things. 
Similarly, because animals move in characteristic ways, the 
zone that links shape to movement might acquire special 
salience for knowledge of animals. On the contrary, the 
distributed-plus-hub view does not predict any specific relation 
between semantic categories and certain modality-specific 
systems. At the hub stage, associations between different pairs 
of attributes (such as shape and name, shape and action, or shape 
and colour) are all processed by a common set of neurons and 
synapses, regardless of the task. Representations in the hub are 
assumed to be amodal in that they can be generated from any 
individual receptive modality and can be used to generate 
behaviour in any individual expressive modality. As a 
consequence, it is hypothesized that a damage to the hub should 
produce a semantic impairment that is independent of the 
modality of input (objects, pictures, words, sounds, tastes, and 
so on) and of the modality of output (for example, naming an 
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object, drawing it or using it correctly) given that information in 
the hub is assumed to be amodal. Figure 5 illustrates the 
differences between the convergence zone theory (referred to as 
the distributed-only view) and the distributed-plus-hub view. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Neuroanatomical distribution of the cortical semantic network 
according to convergence zone theory (referred to as the distributed-only 
view, Panel a) and distributed-plus-hub view (Panel b).  
Reference: Patterson et al. [2007] 
 
Evidence supporting the existence of a hub part in the 
semantic network comes from neuropsychological research. 
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Lesion studies point to the anterior temporal lobe (ATL) as 
being crucial for semantic processing. In particular, a lesion-
overlap study (Damasio, Grabowski, Tranel, Hichwa, & 
Damasio, 1996) that tested picture naming with anomic14 
patients showed different degrees of correlation between the 
locus of the lesion and the symptoms. To illustrate, a lesion 
centred on the left temporal pole resulted in the tightest overlap 
with impaired naming of famous faces, whereas lesions in the 
anterior, inferior left temporal lobe correlated with impaired 
naming of animals. Scarce performance on tool-naming was 
associated with damage in the posterior, lateral left temporal 
lobe as well as in the temporo–occipito–parietal junction but 
with the lowest degree of lesion-symptom overlap. Thus, lesion 
to the left ATL strongly correlated with impaired naming for 
two of the three categories tested (i.e., famous faces, animals, 
tools). When healthy participants performed the same task with 
the same categories in a PET activation paradigm, all three 
stimulus types (i.e., famous faces, animals, tools) yielded 
significant blood-flow increases (relative to a control condition) 
in the left temporal pole.  
In addition, functional (or metabolic) imaging studies have 
shown dysfunctions in the bilateral anterior temporal lobe for 
Semantic Dementia (SD) patients. Diehl, Grimmer, Drzezga, 
Riemenschneider, Förstl, and Kurz, (2004) reported more 
extensive hypometabolism along the length of the inferior left 
temporal lobe. Hypometabolism in SD was also detected in the 
                                                          
14 Patients who have difficulties to name objects. 
 58 
 
left insula and orbito-frontal areas (Desgranges, Matuszewski, 
Piolino, Chételat, Mézenge, Landeau, De La Sayette, Belliard, 
& Eustache, 2007) and in the rostral temporal lobes (Nestor, 
Fryer, & Hodges, 2006). Nestor et al. (2006) also showed that 
semantic impairment is much milder in Alzheimer Disease (AD) 
in which hypometabolism is much more widespread, than in SD 
in which hypometabolism mainly concerns the ATL.  
Consistent with functional imaging studies, structural imaging 
research indicates relative preservation of the posterior temporal 
lobe in SD (Desgranges, et al., 2007; Nestor, et al., 2006; 
Davies, Graham, Xuereb, Williams, & Hodges, 2004; 
Mummery, Patterson, Price, Ashburner, Frackowiak, & Hodges, 
2000). In sum, both metabolic and structural imaging studies of 
patients with SD suggest that lesions are most pronounced in the 
anterior and inferior parts of the temporal lobes. 
It is worth noting that although other functional imaging 
studies have also implicated some combination of frontal, 
posterior temporal, temporo-parietal and parietal regions in the 
cortical semantic network, Devlin, Russell, Davis, Price, 
Wilson, Moss, Matthews, and Tyler (2000) demonstrated that 
the significant anterior temporal lobe activation evident with 
PET is largely absent with fMRI as a consequence of MRI 
susceptibility artefact. That is, the anterior temporal lobe is shy 
to fMRI (see also Patterson et al., 2007).  
The strongest ATL activation is usually observed when people 
are required to recognize or identify unique concepts such as 
famous building or individuals (i.e., Eiffel Tower or Princess 
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Diana, see for example, Gorno-Tempini & Price, 2001; 
Nakamura, Kawashima, Sato, Nakamura, Sugiura, Kato, 
Hatano, Ito, Fukuda, Schormann, & Zilles, 2000) but also names 
and even voices (e.g., Gorno-
Tempini, Price, Josephs, Vandenberghe, Cappa, Kapur, Frackow
iak, & Tempini, 1998; Tsukiura, Mochizuki-Kawai, & Fujii, 
2006; Nakamura, Kawashima, Sugiura, Kato, Nakamura, 
Hatano, Nagumo, Kubota, Fukuda, Ito, & Kojima, 2001). 
Interestingly, SD patients are profoundly impaired at 
recognizing famous individuals from photographs, names and 
verbal descriptions (Snowden, Thompson, & Neary, 2004). 
More broadly, this impairment seems to reflect a general 
sensitivity of SD patients to the specificity with which an item is 
categorized15. Patients perform well if a relatively coarse or 
general categorization of the stimulus is required. For example, 
SD patients can call a picture animal, without being able to 
name it chicken or even bird (Hodges, Graham, & Patterson, 
1995). This pattern does not arise simply because tasks that 
require precise classification are more difficult. Indeed, as 
Rogers and Patterson (2007, see also Rosch, Mervis, Gray, 
Johnson & Boyes-Braem, 1976) showed, healthy adults are 
faster and more accurate at classifying items at the basic level 
(for example, dog) relative to a more general level (for example, 
animal). Patients with SD show the reverse of the basic level 
effect: they have greater difficulties at classifying items at the 
more precise basic or subordinate level. Such findings suggest 
                                                          
15 See also chapter I, section 1 on the sensitivity to specificity of SD. 
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that semantic tasks that require the distinctive classification of a 
stimulus place particularly strong demands on the ATL regions 
that are affected in SD. 
Additional evidence supporting the existence of a hub part in 
the semantic network comes from computational modelling. 
Computer simulations with neural-network models have shown 
that networks in which all forms of information about concepts 
are, at some point, processed through the same population of 
neurons and synapses exhibit functional properties that explain 
how the semantic system is able to learn conceptual similarity 
relationships, that is, higher-order generalizations that disregard 
modality-specific information about objects (Rogers & 
McClelland, 2004). Consider, for example, how a convergent 
zone architecture (referred to as “gating architecture” in Fig. 5, 
Panel a) might encode information about a pear. The pathway 
that stores associations between shape and name will learn a 
representation that encodes both visual and phonological 
similarity to other known objects. Thus, a pear and a light-bulb 
will generate similar representations because they have similar 
shapes; a pear and a bear will generate similar representations 
because they have similar-sounding names; and a pear and a 
banana will generate rather different representations because 
they have different shapes and different-sounding names 
(Patterson et al., 2007). Therefore, the convergent zone 
architecture or gating architecture will not encode conceptual 
similarity relationships, which should capture the fact that pears 
and bananas are semantically related because they are both fruits 
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whereas pears and light-bulbs or pears and bears are not. One 
might suggest that attributing greater weight or salience to some 
sensory or motor features can solve the problem. For instance, if 
similarity of taste is more salient than similarity of shape or 
word-sound, then bananas and pears, which are both sweet, 
might be judged more similar to one another than pears and 
light-bulbs or pears and bears. As highlighted by Patterson et al. 
(2007), the problem with this approach is that the salience of a 
given feature varies from one semantic category to another: 
colour, for example, is important for categorizing fruits 
(consider lemons versus limes), but is irrelevant for categorizing 
toys (see for example, Macario, 1991). Thus, to determine the 
salience of a given sensory, motor or linguistic feature, one must 
know to which category the item belongs, but the item is 
difficult to categorize without knowing the salience of its 
observed features (Gelman & Williams, 1998; Keil, 1989; 
Murphy & Medin, 1985). We are at an impasse: in other words, 
there is no single salience for a given property that will correctly 
capture semantic similarity for all concepts.  
On the contrary, in the distributed-plus-hub view (referred to 
as “convergent architecture” in Fig. 5, Panel b) the same units 
that code the association between shape and name must also 
learn to code relationships between shape and colour, shape and 
action, shape and texture, and so on, as well as complementary 
mappings (that is, mappings in the other direction) between 
these surface representations. As a consequence, the internal 
representations that emerge look very different. They are not 
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dominated by the similarities expressed in any individual 
modality (or pair of modalities), but instead reflect the similarity 
relationships that is apparent across all of the modality-specific 
representations taken together (Patterson et al., 2007). In other 
words, the intermediate representations that arise in the hub can 
promote generalization across items that are conceptually 
related, even if they do not happen to have similar shapes, 
colours, associated actions, and so on. These representations are 
amodal in that they can be generated from any individual 
receptive modality and can be used to generate behaviour in any 
individual expressive modality. They are semantic in that they 
express the conceptual similarity relations among concepts that 
are critical to semantic generalization and induction, even 
though, in themselves, they have no retrievable content (Rogers 
& McClelland, 2004). Rogers et al. (2004) implemented a 
convergent architecture in a fully recurrent connectionist model 
that was trained to map between simple visual representations of 
objects, verbal descriptions of the objects, and the objects’ 
names. Interestingly, representations in the model captured 
aspects of similarity structure that were not apparent when 
considering the verbal descriptions or the visual representations 
alone. For instance, considering just visual similarities, fruits 
and vegetables share many properties with man-made objects 
whereas, considering just the verbal descriptions, fruits and 
vegetables are quite distinct from both animals and man-made 
objects, although they share a few properties with animals. 
When trained on these patterns, the model acquired 
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representations in which the fruits and vegetables were distinct 
from animals and man-made objects, but were actually more 
similar to man-made objects. Thus, the model made the 
counterintuitive suggestion that fruits and vegetables, although 
being natural and not man-made, might be represented as being 
more similar to artefacts than to other natural things like animals 
in the human semantic system. Consistent with this suggestion, 
when asked to classify pictures of apples and other fruits and 
vegetables as being plant (correct), animal, or man-made 
artefact, SD patients mis-assigned a number of fruits and 
vegetables to the artefact category, despite making few errors 
when the choice categories for the apple were fruit, bird or land 
animal (Rogers et al., 2004). 
In sum, the distributed-plus-hub view accomodates both a 
grounded and a more traditional amodal perspective of 
conceptual organization and processing into a single account. It 
is worth acknowledging, however, that while Patterson et al. 
(2007) think that because SD generates highly multi-modal 
deﬁcits then the ATLs must implement amodal representations, 
Bonner, Peelle, Cook, and Grossman (2013) think that multi-
modal deﬁcits caused by SD suggest that in the ATLs reside 
heteromodal perceptual representations, namely representations 
that are encoded in several different perceptual formats (see also 
McCaffrey, 2015). Thus, additional theories about how 
association areas such as the ATLs contribute to conceptual 
knowledge are needed. In this regard, it is worth mentioning 
what Barsalou recently pointed out: “In recent years, Martin 
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(personal communication) has been asking researchers who use 
the term “amodal” what they mean by it. Overwhelmingly, he 
finds that they mean multimodal, not amodal. Sloppy use of 
“amodal” has resulted in this confusing state-of-affairs” 
(Barsalou, 2016, p. 1126).  
Nonetheless, these hybridizations can prove very fruitful not 
only for explaining neuropsychological results but also as a 
plausible and more general account of the organization and 
representation of concepts in the brain.  
2. The conceptual topography theory. The conceptual 
topography theory (CTT, Simmons & Barsalou, 2003) aims at 
integrating amodal and more recent perceptual theories of 
category-specific deficits into one single account that shares 
properties of both classes of theories. In particular, the CTT 
revises Damasio’s (1989) convergence zone theory. While 
Damasio (1989) proposes that conjunctive neurons in CZs play 
no representational roles and only constitute a means of 
reactivating previously active patterns in feature maps, CTT 
assumes that patterns of neurons in CZs can also function as 
stand-alone representations, in particular during automatised 
feed-forward processes such as categorisation and word 
association. For example, during the categorisation of familiar 
objects (e.g., chairs), “active feature detectors feed activation 
into the conjunctive16 neurons that integrate chair features. 
These conjunctive neurons then feed activation to response 
                                                          
16 Simmons & Barsalou (2003) refer to neurons in convergence zones as 
“conjunctive neurons”. 
 65 
 
systems, such as the system that vocally produces a category 
name (e.g., “chair”). In this chain of feed-forward processing, 
the pattern of active conjunctive neurons functions as a 
representation sufficient to produce a correct response – 
reactivating a feature map pattern is not necessary” (Simmons & 
Barsalou, 2003, p. 456). Conversely, under demanding 
conditions such as when constructing, manipulating, or 
evaluating a conceptual representation reactivating a feature 
map pattern becomes necessary (see also Kan, Barsalou, 
Solomon, Minor, & Thompson-Schill, 2003). 
According to Simmons & Barsalou (2003), CTT contains four 
sub-systems on each of the six sensory-motor modalities (i.e., 
visual, auditory, somatosensory, motor, gustatory, olfactory). 
Specifically, each modality contains feature maps, analytic CZs, 
holistic CZs, and modality CZs. To illustrate, feature maps 
detect and represent features such as colour, line orientation, 
pitch, physical pressure at bodily locations, and so forth. 
Analytic CZs conjoin modality-specific conjunctions of features, 
that is, analytic conceptual properties such as shape, color, 
texture, movement, etc. Holistic CZs conjoin modality-specific 
conjunctions of features, that is, holistic conceptual properties 
such as eyes, nose, mouth in the visual modality. Modality CZs 
conjoin analytic and holistic properties on a single modality. 
Neurons in these association areas represent properties such as 
red, round, smooth, etc. In addition to these four subs-ystems, 
cross-modal CZs integrate the modality-specific CZs.  
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The CTT introduces two additional principles to CZ theory: 
the similarity in topography (SIT) and variable dispersion 
principles. Both principles concern the organisation of neurons 
in CZs. Basically, the SIT principle claims that the physical 
structure of the world is reflected in the spatial organization or 
topography of the brain’s association areas. More specifically, 
according to the SIT principle “the spatial proximity of two 
neurons in a CZ reflects the similarity of the features they 
conjoin. As two sets of conjoined features become more similar, 
the conjunctive neurons that link them lie closer together in the 
CZ’s spatial topography” (Simmons & Barsalou, 2003, p. 457). 
For example, on viewing a human face, large numbers of 
neurons distributed throughout visual feature maps become 
active to represent its features. Subsequently, neurons in a visual 
CZ conjoin these features by associating the respective feature 
map neurons. According to the SIT principle, the populations of 
neurons in CZ for a human and a monkey face lie closer 
together than the populations of conjunctive neurons for a 
human and an elephant face. Furthermore, the conjunctive 
neurons that represent all three faces (i.e., human, monkey, and 
elephant) lie closer together than the conjunctive neurons that 
represent some completely different type of object, such as a 
chair. In general, the topographic proximity of neurons in CZ 
reflects the similarity of the features they link. Figure 6 depicts a 
schematic illustration of the SIT principle. 
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Fig. 6. Illustration of localised conjunctive neurons in a visual CZ for the 
features of a human (H), a monkey (M), an elephant (E), and a chair(C). 
Reference: Simmons & Barsalou [2003] 
 
As with previous amodal accounts of knowledge, statistical 
structure of concepts is central for the SIT principle. That is, 
concepts structure mirrors statistical frequency and pairings of 
features of objects in the world. However, unlike previous 
amodal accounts, the SIT principle implements this statistical 
structure topographically in the brain’s association areas.  
  The second additional principle that the conceptual 
topography theory (CTT) develops is the variable dispersion 
principle. Given the distributed character of the CTT, Simmons 
& Barsalou (2003) assume that neurons that represent a category 
in a CZ are located in a distributed area that not only contains 
conjunctive neurons for that category but that also contains 
conjunctive neurons for other categories. Therefore, 
“conjunctive neurons for a category are dispersed in clumps, 
with clumps for other categories falling between” (Simmons & 
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Barsalou, 2003, p. 459). Furthermore, a given clump may 
contain conjunctive neurons used by more than one category. 
The conjunctive neurons for a category are typically not 
contiguous in a CZ. The variable dispersion principle concerns 
these noncontiguous clusters of conjunctive neurons such that: 
“In a CZ, the proximity of the noncontiguous clusters for a 
category reflects the similarity of its instances. As the instances 
of a category decrease in similarity, its noncontiguous clusters 
of conjunctive neurons become increasingly dispersed in the 
CZ’s spatial topography” (Simmons & Barsalou, 2003, p. 459). 
Figure 7 illustrates the variable dispersion principle, showing 
both low and high dispersion profiles for categories having 
similar vs. dissimilar instances respectively (e.g., mammals vs. 
artefacts).  
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Illustration of how noncontiguous clusters of conjunctive neurons 
represent a category, with low dispersion for a category on the left, and high 
dispersion for a category on the right. 
Reference: Simmons & Barsalou [2003] 
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The variable dispersion principle is tightly connected to the 
SIT principle. If according to the SIT principle, proximity of 
neurons reflects features similarity, according to the variable 
dispersion principle, the clusters of conjunctive neurons that 
represent a category lie closer together as within-category 
similarity increases.  
The variable dispersion principle has significant implications 
for conceptual deficits. For example, within-category similarity 
is relatively low for artefacts. A fork and a pan do not resemble 
each other at all. Thus, according to the variable dispersion 
principle, conjunctive neurons that represent artefacts should be 
highly dispersed. As a consequence, the artefacts category 
should be less susceptible to damage. In contrast, because 
animals has much higher within-category similarity, its 
conjunctive neurons should be more tightly localised, and 
therefore this category should be more susceptible to damage. A 
related implication is that certain concepts may be more 
susceptible to lesions in some modality CZs than in others. If the 
actions afforded by tools, for example, are more similar than 
tools’ visual properties, tool deficits should be more likely 
following lesions to motor areas than to visual areas. 
Conversely, if the visual properties for animals are more similar 
than their other properties, animal deficits should be most likely 
to follow lesions to visual areas. 
The SIT and variable dispersion principles also offer an 
explanation for why conceptual deficits disrupt superordinate 
categories. Consider the superordinate category of animals. 
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Because its members share many properties (e.g, they all move, 
eat, have two eyes, have a mouth, have reproductive organs, and 
so on), the conjunctive neurons that code them should all be 
mixed together topographically within a modality CZ. Thus a 
lesion that damages the conjunctive neurons for one basic level 
category, say dog, is likely to damage the conjunctive neurons 
for other basic level categories (e.g., cat, cow, snake, etc.) that 
share its prototypical features (Rosch & Mervis, 1975; 
Hampton, 1993). The result is the loss of a superordinate 
category, or at least much of it.  
In addition, consistent with the conceptual topography theory, 
Fernandino, Binder, Desai, Pendl, Humphries, Gross, Conant, 
and Seidenberg (2015) found that cortex activation patterns 
reﬂected the natural correlations of modalities and attributes in 
the world (e.g., both visual and somatosensory modalities were 
associated with shape, manipulation was also associated with 
shape, the hearing modality was associated with visual motion). 
In addition, they found that areas previously implicated in 
multisensory integration were co-activated by the corresponding 
attributes. Finally, they showed that the only areas activated by 
all attributes were high-level cortical hubs (angular gyrus, 
precuneus/posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex, 
parahippocampal gyrus, and medial prefrontal cortex). 
In sum, topographical mapping might constitute a fundamental 
principle of brain organisation at multiple levels. 
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Summary 
Two classes of theories of concepts were introduced and 
discussed in Part 1: the amodal symbolic accounts of knowledge 
and the grounded accounts of knowledge. Viable hybrid models 
of knowledge, that combine aspects of both classes of theories, 
were then presented. Chapter I illustrated neuropsychological 
results concerning Semantic Dementia (SD) that are compatible 
with an amodal format of concepts. Two important distinctions 
within traditional accounts of knowledge were then discussed: 
the local vs. distributed distinction and the stable vs. flexible 
distinction. Behavioral, electrophysiological and fMRI results 
suggesting a distributed and flexible organization is more likely 
were illustrated.  
Chapter II introduced grounded theories of knowledge as an 
attempt to tackle and solve the symbol grounding problem or 
problem of intentionality that affects amodal accounts. 
Grounded theories purport to show that the reuse of neural 
circuitry for various cognitive purposes is a central 
organizational principle that contribute to explain the functional 
structure of the brain. Behavioral, electrophysiological and 
fMRI evidence supporting this view was presented. The final 
section of chapter II addressed the skeptical claims of opponents 
of grounded accounts with a series of counter-arguments.  
Chapter III presented hybrid models of knowledge suggesting 
fruitful combinations of amodal and grounded aspects of 
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theories of concepts to overcome the strict dichotomy between 
the two outlined views. 
This general review of amodal, grounded, and hybrid accounts 
of knowledge was aimed at showing that the transition from 
amodal to grounded theories of knowledge has not represented a 
fracture in the cognitive science. On the contrary, grounded 
cognitition has complemented traditional approaches taking into 
account the modalities, the body, and the environment’s 
influence on cognitve mechanisms (Barsalou, 2016).  
Importantly, it was pointed out that the distributed and flexible 
organization of concepts developed within the traditional 
accounts of knowledge can also work in the context of the 
grounded accounts. In addition, a continuity between amodal 
and grounded theories of knowledge was highlighted that rests 
on the idea that the conceptual system is organized in a 
modality-specific fashion. Indeed, the modality-specific 
organization of knowledge is the main organizational principle 
of some amodal accounts such as the sensory/functional theory 
(Warrington & McCarthy, 1983, 1987; Warrington & Shallice, 
1984) as well as of grounded theories such as the perceptual 
symbol systems theory (PSS, Barsalou, 1999, 2008). Hybrid 
models further confirm that a blending between the two 
perspectives (i.e., amodal and grounded) can prove very 
advantageous.  
In conclusion, by focusing on the continuity rather than the 
fracture between the two approaches to the representation of 
knowledge in the brain, I did not intend to lessen the scope of 
 73 
 
the debate on the representational format of concepts. Rather, 
my aim was to show that the two perspectives are not absolutely 
incompatible with one another and a compromise is desirable 
and needed much more than a sterile dichotomy. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART  2 
THE DEBATE ON THE FORMAT OF CONCEPTS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 
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OVERVIEW 
There is increasing evidence that modality-specific 
representations underlie concepts (e.g., Pecher, Zeelenberg, & 
Barsalou, 2003; van Dantzig, Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 
2008), memory (e.g., Glenberg, 1997), and language 
comprehension (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Stanfield & 
Zwaan, 2001).  
For the purposes of this dissertation, I will be focusing on 
evidence suggesting that modality-specific representations 
underlie concepts and conceptual processing. Neuroimaging 
research shows that modality-specific cortical areas related to 
sensory and motor processing are involved in semantic 
processing (see Binder & Desai, 2011; Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 
2012 for reviews). The finding that sensorimotor systems are 
engaged during conceptual processing boosts the idea that 
conceptual content is distributed in the sensorimotor systems.  
Behavioral literature offers further evidence in support of the 
assumption that perceptual information is engaged in conceptual 
processing showing a cost for performance in terms of speed 
and accuracy when two different modalities alternate, compared 
to when the same modality is presented (Pecher, Zeelenberg & 
Barsalou, 2003). This effect, known as the Modality-Shifting or 
Modality-Switch effect (henceforth, MSE), has been claimed to 
be the result of a perceptual simulation. This research reports 
four experiments aimed at exploring this claim.  
Experiments 1 & 2 (Study 1) use a standard priming paradigm 
to test whether the MSE is the result of the automatic activation 
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of sensory information. Indeed, as we saw earlier, PSS view 
assumes that perceptual simulations are automatic, that is, they 
function unconsciously as re-enactment of patterns of neural 
activation in sensory-motor areas of the brain rather than as 
conscious mental images. Crucially, we manipulated the 
stimuli’s presentation modality across experiments such that 
Experiment 1 had written sentences as stimuli, whereas 
Experiment 2 had aurally presented sentences. This 
manipulation is aimed at verifying whether the MSE is a robust 
effect that arises in both reading and speech processing. 
Experiments 3 & 4 (Study 2) were designed to further assess 
the scope of the MSE. The main purpose of Study 2 was to test 
whether the impact of the mode of presentation of stimuli (i.e., 
visual: through the monitor, aural: through a pair of headphones) 
on the conceptual MSE is affected by the depth of processing 
required by the task. Specifically, Experiment 3 was aimed at 
examining the influence of the mode of presentation of stimuli 
on the MSE in a property verification priming paradigm, 
whereas Experiment 4 was aimed at examining the same issue in 
a lexical decision priming paradigm.  
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IV. STUDY 1: EXPERIMENTS 1 & 2 
The Modality-Switch Effect: Visually and Aurally Presented 
Prime Sentences Activate Our Senses17 
 
Introduction 
Object’s properties can be perceived through different sensory 
modalities. Thus, while detecting the color of a traffic light in a 
cross-road mainly involves the visual modality, perceiving the 
melody of a violin during a classic concert mainly involves the 
auditory modality. 
According to grounded theories of knowledge (Barsalou, 
2008; for a recent discussion see Pecher 2013), sensory 
information is also active when we process the concepts 
TRAFFIC LIGHT and VIOLIN18. In other words, processing of 
concepts would imply a re-enactment of previously recorded 
and integrated perceptual information concerning the objects or 
entities they refer to. Hence, a similar pattern of neural 
activation in sensory systems would be preserved in 
representation: while processing the concept VIOLIN, for 
instance, the auditory system would re-enact states associated 
with hearing its sound. This re-enactment is also known as 
perceptual simulation.  
According to embodied and grounded theories (see also 
Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2009; Glenberg, 1997), the re-enactment 
                                                          
17 The final publication is available at Frontiers in Psychology via 
http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01668/full. 
18 Henceforth, I use uppercase italics for concepts (VIOLIN) and lowercase 
italics for properties of the concepts (melody). 
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evoked by linguistic stimuli represents a form of simulated 
experience. It is worth mentioning that the notion of simulation 
varies in detail and depth (Borghi & Cimatti, 2010; for a review 
see Decety & Grèzes, 2006). More specifically two slightly 
different views are taken into account in the Embodied 
Cognition theories. According to the first, the notion of 
simulation is mainly based on the re-enactment of past 
sensorimotor experience (Barsalou, 1999). The second view 
stresses the predictive aspect of simulation, suggesting that the 
automatic simulated re-enactment of the observed actions and 
objects is at the basis of a direct form of action preparation and 
comprehension (e.g., Gallese, 2009). Here we mainly focus on 
simulation as a form of multimodal re-enactment of previously 
sensory experiences. 
A growing number of neuroimaging studies show that 
modality-specific brain areas are active during conceptual 
processing (for reviews, see Martin, 2001, 2007; Martin & 
Chao, 2001). For instance, when people process colour names 
(e.g., YELLOW), colour areas in the visual cortex become active 
(Simmons et al., 2007). Conversely, when people process 
concepts for which the auditory modality is important (e.g., 
TELEPHONE), auditory areas become activated (Kiefer et al., 
2008). These results are consistent with the claim that people 
simulate concepts in sensory systems. 
The behavioral literature offers further evidence in support of 
the assumption that perceptual information is engaged in 
conceptual processing, showing a cost for performance in terms 
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of speed and accuracy when two different modalities alternate, 
compared to when the same modality is presented (Marques, 
2006; Pecher, Zeelenberg & Barsalou, 2003, 2004; van Dantzig, 
Pecher, Zeelenberg & Barsalou, 2008; Vermeulen, Niedenthal, 
Luminet, 2007). This effect, known as the Modality-Shifting 
effect or Modality-Switch effect (henceforth, MSE) was initially 
found in a pure perceptual study by Spence, Nicholls & Driver 
(2001). Participants were faced with a visual, tactile, or auditory 
signal that could appear on the left or on the right. Their task 
was to detect the location of the signal (i.e., left or right) as 
rapidly as possible by pressing one of two pedals. Performance 
was faster and more accurate for trials that were preceded by a 
same-modality trial (e.g., visual-visual) than for trials that were 
preceded by a different-modality trial (e.g., auditory-visual).  
Crucially, the MSE was replicated using a conceptual task 
(Pecher et al., 2003). Pecher and colleagues (2003) used a 
property verification task (see Collins & Quillian, 1969; Conrad, 
1972; Glass & Holyoak, 1975; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Smith, 
Shoben, & Rips, 1974; Solomon & Barsalou, 2001 and 2004): 
participants were presented with short sentences having a 
‘concept can be property’ scheme (e.g., ‘BANANA can be 
yellow’) and had to verify whether the property was true of the 
concept. Related pairs of property verification sentences 
alternated throughout the task: a context sentence (i.e., the one 
presented first) was always followed by a target sentence. 
Properties in both context and target sentences could be in one 
of six modalities (vision, audition, taste, smell, touch, and 
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action). The key manipulation consisted in the fact that each 
target sentence could be preceded by a sentence with a property 
in the same or in a different modality. Results showed that 
properties were veriﬁed faster and more accurately in same-
modality trials than in different-modality trials. For instance, 
participants were faster and more accurate when verifying the 
property pastel for BABY CLOTHES, if they previously verified 
the property yellow for BANANA (both visual) rather than the 
property rustling for LEAVES (auditory context – visual target). 
This finding suggests that conceptual processing strongly relies 
on perceptual and motor information. 
However, two possible criticisms of the study by Pecher et al. 
(2003) lay on the fact that (1) their property veriﬁcation 
paradigm might have involved less automatic processes 
compared to those that a simulation would entail (on the 
automaticity of simulation see Jeannerod, 2006; Pulvermüller, 
2005); (2) the MSE with conceptual representations could be 
explained assuming that concepts are abstract, amodal symbols 
rather than grounded in perception and action systems (see 
Mahon & Caramazza, 2008 for a discussion).  
As to the first criticism, indeed, it has been argued that 
simulations are fast, implicit and automatic and only involve 
exogenous attention. In a recent study, Connell & Lynott 
(2012) linked perceptual attention to conceptual processing (on 
the relationship between concepts and attention see also 
Myachykov, Scheepers and Shtyrov, 2013). These authors 
claimed that while exogenous attentional mechanisms are 
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involved when incoming stimuli automatically grab attention, 
endogenous attentional mechanisms are involved when people 
consciously focus attention on a particular modality (see also 
Connell & Lynott, 2010). Thus, only exogenous attentional 
mechanisms would be at work during a perceptual simulation, 
inducing, for instance, the automatic pre-activation of specific 
sensory modalities during reading. Automatically pre-activated 
specific modalities could then interfere with or facilitate the 
subsequent processing of semantic information yielding the 
MSE (see also Connell & Lynott, 2014). However, Pecher et 
al. (2003) had participants performing a double property 
verification task on each trial, one on the context and one on 
the target sentence. In addition, no time limit was provided to 
carry out the task. Therefore, participants were possibly lead to 
rely on strategic processes involving endogenous attention, 
such as constructing a mental image of the concept and 
property described in the sentences. Although mental imagery 
can be considered as “the best known case of […] simulation 
mechanisms, [it] typically results from deliberate attempts to 
construct conscious representations in working memory, 
[whereas] other forms of simulation often appear to become 
active automatically and unconsciously outside working 
memory” (Barsalou 2008, p. 619, see also Kiefer & Barsalou, 
2013; Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012). For instance, 
Pulvermüller et al. (2000) showed that semantic activation in 
the sensorimotor cortex in passive reading tasks was present  ̴ 
200 ms after word onset which would reflect stimulus-
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triggered early lexico-semantic processes (i.e. simulation) 
rather than post-lexical processes (i.e. imagery, see also 
Pulvermüller, 2005; on the generation of mental images see 
Farah, Weisberg and Monheit, 1989). Since in Pecher et al.’s 
paradigm participants had to perform a property verification 
task also on the context sentence and each sentence was 
presented until a response was given, one could reasonably 
argue that post-lexical processes involving endogenous 
attentional mechanisms could explain the MSE. 
As to the second criticism, van Dantzig and colleagues (2008) 
sought evidence for the involvement of sensory information in 
conceptual processing that could not be explained by amodal 
symbols. According to amodal symbols accounts of concepts 
(Barsalou & Hale, 1993; Collins & Quillian, 1969; Smith & 
Medin, 1981), modal representations are turned into abstract, 
amodal symbols that represent knowledge about experience. 
Although being amodal, these symbols might still be organized 
so that to reflect their modality. The MSE with conceptual 
representations (Pecher et al., 2003) could hence hinge on 
connections between these symbols. van Dantzig et al. (2008) 
investigated the effect of a perceptual task such that of Spence 
and colleagues on a conceptual task such that of Pecher and 
colleagues. More specifically, the authors asked participants to 
perform a perceptual left/right spatial discrimination task 
followed by a conceptual property verification task, with the 
latter used as the target task. On each trial, participants first 
detected left/right visual, auditory or tactile signals (i.e., a light 
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flash, a tone or a vibration), as in Spence et al. (2001), and then 
judged whether a visual, auditory or tactile property was true of 
a concept, as in Pecher et al. (2003).  
Results indicate that participants were faster at verifying 
whether a property was true of a concept if that property was in 
the same sensory modality as the immediately preceding 
perceptual signal. Hence, participants, for example, were faster 
at verifying that BABY CLOTHES are pastel if they previously 
detected a light flash rather than a tone or a vibration. This 
finding provides evidence that pure perceptual processing (i.e., 
perceiving stimuli without any semantic meaning) affects the 
activation of conceptual processing. Since no meaningful 
relationship existed between the perceptual signals of the first 
task and the concepts of the second task the authors could 
conclude that the MSE cannot be explained by amodal symbols. 
The present study aims at investigating whether the MSE is 
the result of the activation of sensory information when 
exogenous attentional mechanisms are involved. To this end, we 
introduced two key modifications of Pecher et al. (2003) and 
van Dantzig et al.’s (2008) studies. First, we implemented a 
priming paradigm in which context sentences required no task 
and were presented for a limited amount of time (from now on 
we will refer to these sentences as “prime sentences”). By using 
such a priming paradigm we aimed at preventing participants 
from deliberately drawing upon strategic processing for 
comprehending prime sentences. Our aim was to rule out the 
possibility that the involvement of sensory information in 
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language comprehension was the consequence of a late post-
lexical strategy to imagine objects and objects properties. Given 
that recent studies (Trumpp et al., 2013 and 2014) showed that 
subliminally presented sound and action words can activate 
auditory and motor systems, we reasonably hypothesized to find 
the MSE although no instructed task was required on prime 
sentences presented for a limited amount of time. 
The second key difference is that we used prime sentences that 
made a linguistic description of the pure perceptual stimuli used 
in Spence et al. (2001) and in van Dantzig et al. (2008) studies 
so that to exclude connections between amodal symbols as a 
possible explanation of the effect. Given that language 
comprehension involves the construction of a perceptual 
simulation (Barsalou, 1999; Zwaan, 2004), and that perceptual 
simulations only involve exogenous attentional mechanisms, it 
is likely that reading or listening to a linguistic description of a 
pure perceptual stimulus could pre-activate specific sensory 
modalities, which could then facilitate or interfere with the 
processing of subsequent semantic information. 
Moreover, in order to avoid any possible semantic association 
between prime and target sentences, concepts were either 
semantically unrelated or low semantically related. In Appendix 
A we report a norming study we have conducted to assess 
semantic relatedness of our stimuli (see also Marques, 2006 on 
the effects of semantic relatedness). To illustrate, our 
participants were first presented with a prime sentence 
describing a LIGHT or a SOUND’s perceptual property (e.g., 
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“LIGHT is flickering”; “SOUND is echoing”) and then with a 
target sentence (e.g., “BUTTER is yellowish”, “BRUSHWOOD 
crackle”) upon which a property verification judgment was to be 
made.  
Finally, we also included a further manipulation by 
introducing neutral prime stimuli, that is, prime stimuli which 
did not convey any sensory information. Our purpose was to 
compare performances on target sentences preceded by sensory 
information (i.e., visual and auditory prime sentences) with 
performances on target sentences that were not preceded by 
sensory information (i.e., neutral prime sentences). Since neutral 
prime items were not expected to trigger a perceptual 
simulation, that is, they were not expected to involve any 
attentional mechanisms which could pre-activate a specific 
sensory modality, we either predict neither facilitation nor 
interference due to the fact that participants were unable to pre-
activate a sensory modality.  
We ran an Experiment in which prime and target sentences 
conveying both visual and auditory contents were presented 
either visually or aurally19. We predicted to find the MSE even 
with this modified property verification paradigm. In other 
words, we expected to find a better performance when prime 
                                                          
19 Initially there were two distinct experiments to this study. Experiment 1 in 
which prime and target sentences were presented visually on the monitor, and 
Experiment 2 in which prime and target sentences were presented aurally 
through headphones. However, for purposes of exposition, the two 
experiments have become one with two conditions (visual, auditory). 
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and target sentences share the same modality compared to when 
they do not.   
 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-four students from the University of Bologna (43 
females; mean age: 20.26, SD: 1.58) participated in this study in 
return for course credits. All participants were Italian native 
speakers, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing 
by self-report, and were naïve as to the purpose of the 
experiment. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
two between-subjects conditions (visual vs. auditory). The 
experiment was approved by the Psychology Department’s 
ethical committee of the University of Bologna. Written 
informed consent was obtained from all individual participants 
included in the study. Minors did not take part in this study. 
  
Materials 
Prime items 
We used 96 prime items. Forty-eight consisted of 24 visual 
and 24 auditory concept-property pairs. The concepts presented 
were always “LIGHT” and “SOUND” and the properties were 
adjectives associated with them (e.g., “flickering/echoing”, for 
the visual and auditory concepts, respectively). Twenty-four 
properties were used, 12 for the visual and 12 for the auditory 
prime sentences. These properties were repeated once 
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throughout the experiment. Twenty properties out of 24 were 
taken from the norming study by Lynott and Connell (2009), 
who classified several object’s properties along a unimodality – 
multimodality continuum. The twenty properties we selected 
from their pool were all unimodal, being mainly perceived either 
through the sense of sight or through the sense of hearing. 
Lynott and Connell (2009) found indeed that using unimodal 
properties instead of multimodal ones leads to a markedly larger 
MSE. Since our experimental design needed 24 proprieties, 
following Lynott and Connell’s (2009) combined criterion, we 
selected four further properties after 50 Italian adjectives had 
been rated by 22 participants (see Appendix A). For an overview 
of the visual and auditory prime sentences see Appendix B.  
The other 48 prime items consisted of neutral stimuli, that is, 
for the visual condition a meaningless strings of symbols (e.g. # 
° ^ ? *) and for the auditory condition a white noise. Both served 
to create a neutral modality compared to the same and different 
ones. 
 
Target sentences 
We used 96 target sentences: forty-eight critical target 
sentences, consisted of half visual and half auditory concept-
property pairs taken from the van Dantzig et al.’s study (2008). 
In these critical pairs the property was always true of the 
concept (e.g., “BUTTER is yellowish”, “BRUSHWOOD 
crackles”). Each pair was used only once in both the visual and 
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auditory condition of the experiment. Two properties were 
repeated once across the pairs, although paired with different 
concepts (i.e., “a BEE buzzes”, “a FLY buzzes”; “BROCCOLI is 
green”, “SPINACH is green”). For an overview of the visual and 
auditory target sentences see Appendix B. The remaining forty-
eight stimuli were filler sentences, always taken from van 
Dantzig et al. (2008). In the filler sentences the property was 
always false of the concept. Twelve filler sentences had a false 
visual property (e.g., “the WATER is opaque”), 12 had a false 
auditory property (e.g., “the COMB sings”), whereas the 
remaining 24 filler sentences had a false property that did not 
belong to any modality (e.g., “the BED is sleepy”). This latter 
type of fillers was used in order to avoid participants from 
basing their answers on a superficial word-association strategy, 
rather than on deeper conceptual-processing (see also Solomon 
& Barsalou, 2004). 
For both the visual and auditory condition, each participant 
was presented in total with 96 prime sentences (48 modal and 48 
neutral) followed by 96 target sentences (48 critical and 48 
filler) throughout the experimental session. Prime and target 
items were randomly combined to form same, different and 
neutral modality conditions. Each target sentence appeared in 
the same, different and neutral modality conditions, 
counterbalanced across lists. This resulted in a comparable 
distribution of semantic relatedness and stimulus size measures 
across experimental conditions. To sum up, the critical targets 
could be combined with: 1) a neutral prime item (neutral 
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modality); 2) a same-modality prime sentence (visual-visual; 
auditory-auditory, same modality) or 3) a different-modality 
prime sentence (visual-auditory, auditory-visual, different 
modality).  
 
Procedure 
The experiment took place in a dimly lit room. Participants sat 
in front of a computer screen, at a distance of about 60 cm. For 
the visual condition, each trial started with the presentation of a 
fixation cross (0.5 cm x 0.5 cm) for 500 ms. Immediately after 
the fixation, the prime sentence appeared in the middle of the 
screen for 1500 ms. Then, the target sentence was displayed on 
the center of the screen until a response was given or until 3000 
ms had elapsed. Prime and target sentences ranged from 5.9 cm 
to 17.3 cm (from 9 to 29 characters) which resulted in a visual 
angle range between 5.6° and 16.5°. All words were bold 
lowercase Courier new 18. These measures were the same 
across all conditions. Participants were instructed to read the 
prime and target sentences and then judge, as quickly and 
accurately as possible, whether in each target sentence the 
property was true of the concept. Participants underwent a short 
practice session of 24 stimuli (different from those used in the 
experimental blocks), during which a feedback was given about 
their response. For the auditory condition, the procedure was the 
same, except that (1) a “bip” sound was presented in alternative 
to the fixation cross in order to announce the beginning of a new 
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trial; (2) the prime and the target sentences were presented 
aurally, through headphones, for 2000 ms and 4000 ms 
respectively. In both the visual and the auditory condition, half 
of the participants pressed the “s” and “k” keys of a “qwerty” 
keyboard when the property was respectively true and false of 
the concept, that is, when the target was a critical or a filler 
sentence, respectively. The other half of the participants was 
assigned to the reverse mapping.   
In order to control for sequence effects, we avoided to present 
the same modality for more than two consequent trials. For 
example, a prime sentence in the visual modality could be 
followed by another visual prime sentence only once. Then an 
auditory or neutral prime had to be shown. The same rule held 
for the target sentences. Two different sequences, composed of 
the same 192 concept-property pairs, were built. In both visual 
and auditory conditions, the sequence presentation was balanced 
across participants, such that half of the participants was 
presented with one sequence and the remaining ones with the 
other. 
Participants underwent two blocks of 48 prime sentences 
followed by 48 target sentences each (24 critical and 24 filler) 
and could take a short break between them. The experiment 
lasted approximately 20 minutes. 
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Results 
Responses to filler sentences were discarded. Omissions 
(3.74%), Incorrect responses (17.90%) and RTs faster/slower 
than the overall participant mean minus/plus 2 standard 
deviations (3.61%) were excluded from the analyses. 
Mean Response Times (RTs) of the correct responses were 
submitted to a Repeated Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with 
Modality (same vs. different vs. neutral) as the within-subject 
factor and Condition (visual vs. auditory) as the between-
subjects factor (see Table 1 and Figure 8 for the results).  
Results indicated that the main effect of Modality, F(2, 124) = 
58.32, MSe = 13302.62, p< .001, ηp2 = .485, was significant. 
Paired-sample t-tests showed that decision latencies for same 
modality targets (M = 2000 ms, SD = 502.73 ms) were shorter 
than for different modality targets (M = 2070 ms, SD = 535.67 
ms) t(63) = 5.7, p <.001 and decision latencies for neutral 
modality targets (M = 2216 ms, SD = 616.95 ms) were longer 
than for both same and different modality targets t(63) = 8.1, p 
<.001, t(63) = -6.4, p <.001. 
The main effect of Condition, F(1, 62) = 320.32, MSe = 
146787.41, p< .001, ηp2 = .838, resulted as significant, showing 
that the auditory condition was slower than the visual one (2590 
ms vs. 1660 ms, respectively). However, it is worth mentioning 
that this result is due to a technical specification in the 
procedure: aurally presented prime and target sentences lasted 
longer than the visual ones, considering that spoken sentences 
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need to be listened to until the end before participants could be 
able to release a response, while visually presented sentences 
were completely available at once. 
The interaction between the Modality and Condition factors 
was significant, F(2, 87.1) = 7.88, MSe = 18941.26., p< .001, ηp2 
= .113.  
Paired-sample t-tests in the visual condition showed that 
decision latencies for same modality targets were faster than for 
different modality targets t(31) = 3.2, p <.01, whereas decision 
latencies for neutral modality targets were slower than for both 
same and different modality targets t(31) = 6.5, p <.001, t(31) = 
-4.1, p <.001. Similarly, paired-sample t-tests in the auditory 
condition showed that decision latencies for same modality 
targets were faster than for different modality targets t(31) = 4.9, 
p <.001, whereas decision latencies for neutral modality targets 
were slower than for both same and different modality targets 
t(31) = 6.5, p <.001, t(31) = -5.4, p <.001. In order to investigate 
the difference between the magnitude of the MSEs found, we 
run an additional Univariate analysis of Variance with the 
magnitude of the MSEs as dependent variable and the Condition 
as the only between-subjects factor. The magnitude of MSEs 
was computed by subtracting the mean RT for the same 
modality from the mean RT for the different modality. Results 
showed that the MSE found for the visual condition (50 ms) did 
not differ from the one found for the auditory one (90 ms), F(1, 
62) = 2.8, p= .10, ηp2 = .043.  
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In order to exclude a speed accuracy trade-off, mean of the 
incorrect responses and omissions were submitted to an 
ANOVA with the same factors as those of the RTs analysis. As 
to the incorrect responses, neither the main effects, nor the 
interaction were significant, Fs <2, ps > .74, ηp2 < .004. As to the 
omissions, results indicated that the main effect of Modality F(2, 
124) = 11.32, MSe = 36.22, p< .001, ηp2 = .155 was significant. 
In addition, the interaction between Modality and Condition was 
significant F(2, 124) = 4.31, MSe = 51.35., p< .05, ηp2 = .065. 
Paired sample t-tests showed that in the visual condition 
participants made more omissions in the neutral modality (3.7%) 
than in the different one (1.4%), t(31) = 2.5, p <.05. While in the 
auditory condition all the comparisons resulted significant 
showing that participants made less omissions in the same 
modality (1.3%) than in the different one (3.2%), t(31) = 2.3, p 
<.05, whereas omissions in the neutral modality (7.6%) 
outreached omissions in both different and same modalities 
t(31) = 2.6, p <.05, t(31) = 3.3, p <.05. 
 
General Discussion 
The goal of the current study was to investigate whether the 
MSE is the result of the activation of sensory information due to 
exogenous attentional mechanisms. We used a different 
paradigm from previous studies in order to exclude strategic 
processing and amodal symbols accounts of concepts as possible 
explanations of the effect. In line with the hypotheses, our 
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findings showed a robust MSE, that is, a facilitation for the 
processing of those target sentences the modality of which was 
formerly primed by a linguistically described perceptual 
stimulus. In other words, participants were faster when they 
responded to a target sentence in the same modality as the 
previous prime sentence rather than different. These results 
confirm that when the target’s modality correspond to the one 
pre-activated by the content of the prime sentence, RTs are 
speeded, while when these modalities do not correspond the 
time needed to complete the task is slowed down.  
It is worth noting that our findings also showed slower RTs 
and a higher percentage of omissions for the neutral modality 
compared to the different modality. One might argue that the 
different modality could be expected to be the slowest modality. 
Indeed, activating information that does not correspond with 
what has to be processed later (i.e., different modality) should 
interfere with the processing of subsequent information and, 
thus, should require longer response times overall. However, the 
slowest performances observed with the neutral modality were 
possibly due to the fact that in this case the prime items (i.e. 
meaningless strings of symbols or white noise) were 
perceptually non informative. Unlike the visual and auditory 
prime sentences, the neutral prime did not pre-activate any 
specific sensory modality, neither correspondent nor non-
correspondent. If the account for the MSE and the hypothesis 
that a neutral prime do not pre-activate any sensory modalities 
are correct, we could assume that the neutral prime did not 
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trigger any perceptual simulation. Since no perceptual 
simulation took place with neutral prime items, participants 
could not take advantage of a general activation of the sensory 
system and this consequently resulted in an overall delay and a 
higher occurrence of omissions in the processing of the target 
sentences. This result is in line with a recent study by Connell 
and colleagues (Connell, Lynott & Dreyer, 2012), in which the 
conceptual processing of non-manipulable objects (e.g., cars or 
windmills) was not influenced by either a prior tactile or 
proprioceptive stimulation, showing that perceptually 
informative stimuli implied no facilitation effect but rather 
slowed down the response time needed to complete a task on 
perceptually non informative stimuli. 
A potential concern is that participants could rely on a word 
association strategy to perform the property verification task 
upon target sentences. However, in the current experiment 
participants could not carry out a superficial processing of 
stimuli, using only word-level representations, for at least two 
reasons. First, the semantic domains across prime and target 
sentences were very distant to allow for a word association 
strategy (see also Marques, 2006): while target sentences 
described perceptual properties of objects, prime sentences 
described properties of two perceptual categories (i.e., light and 
sound), hence no main semantic association was available across 
them. In addition, in order to avoid participants using the word 
association strategy, we drew upon highly associated concepts 
and properties on false trials (i.e., fillers). Indeed, previous 
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studies (James, 1975; McCloskey, & Glucksberg, 1979; Smith, 
Shoben & Rips, 1974) showed that manipulating the difficulty 
of false trials varies the depth of processing on true trials (see 
also Solomon & Barsalou, 2004). Therefore, rather than have 
participants reject unassociated false properties for concepts in 
the filler trials (e.g., unripe for BED), we had participants reject 
associated ones (e.g., sleepy for BED). For associated false 
properties, participants could not respond “false” on the basis of 
the word association strategy because the concept and the 
property were actually somehow associated (i.e., sleepy people 
go to bed). Thus, in order to determine whether the property was 
true of the concept, participants must access conceptual 
knowledge for BED and sleepy and realize, for instance, that 
rather than being sleepy a bed is used by sleepy people. 
Overall, the results of the present study boost and broaden 
previous findings which showed a significant MSE during an 
on-line perceptual task (Spence et al., 2001), a property 
verification task (Pecher et al., 2003) and across perceptual and 
conceptual tasks (van Dantzig et al., 2008). More broadly, our 
results support the accounts of the role of perceptual attention on 
conceptual processing (Connell & Lynott, 2010, 2012, 2014) 
showing that exogenous attentional mechanisms are at work 
during perceptual simulation and are responsible for the MSE. 
Although we cannot completely rule out that the MSE we found 
is due to strategic or imagery processes, the use of a standard 
priming paradigm represents an important difference compared 
to previous work. Indeed, while in previous studies the sensory 
 100  
 
modality was likely to be strategically activated when 
performing the task on the context sentence, in our experiment 
we found a MSE even though participants were not required to 
perform any task on the prime sentences. That is, in our 
experiment it was completely unnecessary to directly and 
explicitly pre-activate a specific sensory modality, therefore the 
MSE we found is likely to be due to an implicit and indirect pre-
activation of sensory modalities. Ultimately, we showed that the 
MSE also occurs when participants are prevented from drawing 
upon strategic processing, furthering the hypothesis that the 
MSE arises from a simulation process during which exogenous 
attention operates. In addition, we showed that not only a 
perceptual stimulus (van Dantzig et al., 2008) but also a 
perceptual linguistically described stimulus triggers the pre-
activation of a sensory modality: reading or listening to a 
sentence describing a light or a sound’s perceptual property 
sufficed to spark off a simulation, even though no task was 
required on that sentence. 
In conclusion, the simulation of an object varies considerably 
across occasions. When reading or listening to a sentence 
involving a particular object in a certain situation, implicit 
perceptual attention (i.e., exogenous attention) activates a 
specific modality. If that modality had been previously activated 
by either a perceptual stimulus or a perceptual linguistically 
described stimulus, the processing of semantic information that 
relates to that modality in the sentence is facilitated. This is far 
from implying that any given object does only relate to a certain 
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modality. Rather, other relevant modalities might be temporarily 
inhibited. In facts, modalities represented in simulations vary on 
the basis of their activation. Future exploration of the MSE 
could use this modified property verification paradigm with 
multimodal concepts in order to investigate what happens when 
multiple modalities compete during a simulation. 
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Table and Figure 
Table 1: Mean Response Times (in Milliseconds) with Standard 
Deviations in parenthesis, as a Function of Modality (same, 
different, neutral) for both visual and auditory conditions. The 
MSE is computed by subtracting response times in the same 
modality from response times in the different modality. 
Asterisks denote significant differences. 
 
 Visual Condition Auditory Condition 
Same 1538 (178.3) 2462 (202.2) 
Different 1588 (206.5) 2552 (245.4) 
Neutral 1676 (222.2) (349.1) 
MSE 50* 90* 
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Figure 8: Mean Response Times (in Milliseconds) as a Function 
of Modality (same, different, neutral) for both visual and 
auditory conditions. Bars are standard Errors. 
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Appendix A 
Rating of the 50 Italian adjectives 
A set of 50 words was selected from the Italian dictionary 
Sabatini-Coletti. Each word (either an adjective or present 
participle of a verb) could belong to the auditory or to the visual 
sensory modality (e.g., ritmato, accecante).  
The rating was administered with an on line procedure. 
Twenty-two participants, all Italians native speakers (13 
females; mean age: 23 years old; sd. 4 years) were tested. To 
avoid order presentation effects, participants were split into two 
equal groups having two different orders of item presentation. 
Participants’ task was to rate, on 5 separate 5-points Likert 
scales (where 1 = not at all; 5 = greatly) the extent to which each 
item is experienced through each of the five senses. For 
instance, participants were faced with the item “bright” and were 
asked to rate to what extent they experienced this property by 
the touch, the hearing, the sight, the sense of smell and by the 
taste.  
Participants’ average score for each item in each modality was 
computed. In order to compute the modality exclusivity and 
modality strength indexes as in Lynott and Connell (2009) and 
compare our 5-points (1-5) Likert scale to their 6-point (0-5) 
scale we applied the following conversion formula: (5/4* the 
score obtained for the item in each modality) – 5/4. This allowed 
us to keep the threshold of the modality strength and the 
modality exclusivity to 3.5 and .65 respectively. Four items (2 
visual, 2 auditory) scored strong on modality strength (3.5-5) 
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and high on modality exclusivity (65%-100%) showing their 
unimodality.  
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Appendix B 
 
Overview of the visual and auditory prime and target sentences
Visual Prime Stimuli Visual Prime Stimuli Visual Target Stimuli Visual Target Stimuli 
English version Italian translation English version Italian translation 
Light is bright La luce è intensa Butter is yellowish Il burro è giallognolo 
Light is colourful La luce è colorata Broccoli is green Il broccolo è verde 
Light is dazzling La luce è abbagliante Chocolate is dark brown Il cioccolato è marrone 
Light is dim La luce è soffusa An eggplant is dark purple La melanzana è viola 
Light is flickering La luce è intermittente An inner tube is black La camera d'aria è scura 
Light is gleaming La luce è splendente A cassette tape is black La musicassetta è nera 
Light is glowing La luce è raggiante A diamond glistens Il diamante brilla 
Light is gold La luce è dorata A squirrel is red-brown Lo scoiattolo è rossiccio 
Light is shimmering La luce è scintillante An ice cube is transparent Il cubetto di ghiaccio è trasparente 
Light is translucent La luce è luminosa A cellar is dark La cantina è buia 
Light is blinding La luce è accecante A jellyfish is translucent La medusa è lucida 
Light is flashing La luce è lampeggiante A leopard is spotted Il leopardo è maculato 
  An orca is black-and-white L'orca è bianca e nera 
  Peppermint is white La mentina è bianca 
  A chessboard is chequered La scacchiera è a quadri 
  A razorblade is silver La lametta è argentata 
  A tennis ball is yellow La palla da tennis è gialla 
  A walnut is brown La noce è bruna 
  A wasp is striped La vespa è striata 
  A swimming pool is azure blue La piscina è azzurra 
  Ham is pink Il prosciutto cotto è rosa 
  Honey is golden-yellow Il miele è ambrato  
  Mayonnaise is light yellow La maionese è giallina 
  Spinach is dark green Gli spinaci sono verdi 
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Auditory Prime Stipuli Auditory Prime Stipuli Auditory Target Stimuli Auditory Target Stimuli 
English version Italian translation English version Italian translation 
Sound is deafening Il suono è assordante A bee buzzes L’ape ronza 
Sound is echoing Il suono è echeggiante A flute is high-pitched Il fauto è di tno acuto 
Sound is husbed Il suono è sommesso A scooter hums Il motorino strepita 
Sound is loud Il suono è alto A bicycle bell rings Il campanello trilla 
Sound is mute Il suono è muto A church organ clangs L’organo vibra 
Sound is noisy Il suono è rumoroso A cricket chirps Il grillo canta 
Sound is shrill Il suono è penetrante A saxophone blares Il sassofono è squillante 
Sound is sonorous Il suono è altisonante A ship’s hom is low- pitched Il fischio della nave è basso 
Sound is squealing Il suono è stridente A siren wails La sirena urla 
Sound is husky Il suoni è rauco A station hall is noisy La stazione è chiassosa 
Sound is croaking Il suono è gracchiante A tram grinds Il tram sferraglia 
Sound is audible Il suono è udibile A triangle jingles Il triangolo tintinna 
  A trumpet sounds shrill La tromba è stridula 
  A typewriter rattles La macchina da scrivere ticchetta 
  A fly buzzes La mosca ronza 
  An airplan is loud L’aereo è roboante 
  A truck honks L’autocarro strombazza 
  An alarm clock ticks L’orologio fa tic tac 
  Autumn leaves rustle Le foglie frusciano 
  Brushwood crackles Il sottobosco crepita 
  High heels tap I tacchi alti picchettano 
  Thunder rumbles Il tuono rimbomba 
  Pans clang Le pentole urtano fragorosamente 
  A railroad crossing rings Il passaggio alivello suona 
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V. STUDY 2: EXPERIMENTS 3 & 4 
The Multilevel Modality-Switch Effect: What Happens when 
We See the Bees Buzzing and Hear the Diamonds 
Glistening20 
 
Introduction 
In people’s everyday life, the majority of experiences involve 
multiple sensory modalities. We are thus required to be able to 
switch across different sensory modalities in different situations. 
A classic example involves the musicians in an orchestra: they 
are required to be able to quickly process visually presented 
auditory contents (i.e., sheet music along with the conductor’s 
gestures) in order to perform. However, this only happens 
through years of studying. Indeed, recent research has shown 
that people experience a cognitive cost in shifting attention 
between different sensory modalities. Interestingly, such 
cognitive cost occurs both when switching between events 
presented in different modalities (Spence, Nicholls & Driver, 
2001) as well as when switching between sentences having 
different-modality contents (Pecher, Zeelenberg & Barsalou, 
2003). For example, switching from the sentence “BLENDER is 
loud” to the sentence “BANANA is yellow” incurs a processing 
cost much like switching from an auditory tone to a light flash. 
This phenomenon is known as Modality-Shifting or Modality-
Switch Effect (hereafter MSE).  
                                                          
20 The final publication is available at Springer via 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13423-016-1150-2. 
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The MSE with language has been extensively explored with 
both behavioral (Marques, 2006; Pecher, Zeelenberg & 
Barsalou, 2004; Scerrati, Baroni, Borghi, Galatolo, Lugli & 
Nicoletti, 2015; van Dantzig, Pecher, Zeelenberg & Barsalou, 
2008; see also Vermeulen, Niedenthal, Luminet, 2007 for a 
similar result with emotional concepts) and ERP studies 
(Collins, Pecher, Zeelenberg, Coulson, 2011; Hald, Marshall, 
Janssen, Garnham, 2011; Hald, Hocking, Vernon, Marshall & 
Garnham, 2013). Whether the finding of a purely perceptual 
phenomenon during conceptual processing is just the 
epiphenomenal result of spreading activation or evidence 
supporting the assumption that perceptual information is 
engaged in conceptual processing is debated. On the one hand, it 
has been argued that the conceptual system is separated from 
sensory information (disembodied cognition hypothesis, see 
Mahon & Caramazza, 2008; Mahon & Hickok, 2016 for 
discussions). On this account, the MSE would reflect the way in 
which activation spreads throughout the system, therefore it 
would not reveal anything about semantic processing. On the 
other hand, it has been assumed that the perceptual and 
conceptual systems are tightly interwoven and share the same 
processing mechanisms. Proponents of the grounded accounts of 
knowledge (Barsalou, 2008; for recent reviews see Borghi and 
Caruana, 2015; Pecher, 2013) assume that knowledge 
representation and processing is achieved by reactivating aspects 
of experience. In particular, conceptual processing would imply 
constructing a sensorimotor simulation of the objects or events 
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concepts refer to. Such a simulation would involve the partial 
reactivation of those brain areas that were also active during our 
interaction with the concepts’ referents. For example, on 
processing the concept DOG, brain areas that represent visual, 
auditory, tactile, olfactory, gustatory, affective, and motor 
information about dogs would be liable to partial reactivation. 
Importantly, simulations are sketchy records of experience that 
can be flexibly adapted to the context and task at hand 
(Barsalou, 1999; Gallese, 2009).  
Recently, Scerrati et al. (2015) obtained evidence that 
sensorimotor simulations can also be triggered by a perceptual, 
linguistically described stimulus presented in a sensory modality 
different from vision (i.e., the auditory modality). Participants 
were presented with a prime sentence describing a light or a 
sound’s perceptual property (e.g., “The light is flickering”, “The 
sound is echoing”) then they were required to perform a 
property-verification task on a target sentence with a vision-
related or a hearing-related content (e.g., “Butter is yellowish”, 
“Leaves rustle”). The sensory modality activated by the content 
of the prime sentence could be compatible with the target’s 
content modality (e.g., vision-vision: “The light is flickering” 
followed by “Butter is yellowish”) or not (e.g., vision-audition: 
“The light is flickering” followed by “Leaves rustle”). Crucially, 
the stimuli’s presentation modality was manipulated such that 
half of the participants was faced with written prime and target 
sentences while the other half was faced with spoken prime and 
target sentences. Results showed that participants were faster at 
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judging whether a certain property was true of a given concept 
when the target’s content modality corresponded to the one pre-
activated by the content of the prime sentence with both visual 
and aural presentation of stimuli.  
In the present study we were interested in examining whether 
switching between different mode of presentation (i.e., visual, 
aural) across prime and target sentences conveying a sensory 
content brings about a modality switching cost. Specifically, we 
aimed at understanding whether and how the conceptual MSE is 
modulated by the mode of presentation of stimuli. To our 
knowledge, no previous study has explored this issue in regard 
to the MSE. Interestingly, however, different studies found that 
sentence processing can be affected by mode of presentation. 
Kaschak, Zwaan, Aveyard and Yaxley (2006, Experiment 2) 
showed that participants were faster in making sensibility 
judgements on target sentences when the direction of motion 
implied by the sentence with a hearing-related content (e.g., 
“The commuter had just arrived on the platform when the 
subway roared into the station”) and the direction of motion 
depicted by a concurrent auditory stimulus were the same, 
provided that both the sentence and the stimulus were aurally 
presented. In a different yet related study, Vermeulen, Corneille 
and Niedenthal (2008) showed that asking people to store three 
visual or auditory items (i.e., pictures or sounds) in short-term 
memory for a subsequent memory task resulted in a worse 
performance in an intervening property verification task when 
the latter concerned sentences involving properties in the same 
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modality as that of the stored items (interference hypothesis). 
Vermeulen et al. (2008) suggested that the general attentional 
load imposed upon participants together with the high 
complexity of the dual-task paradigm used in their study 
moderated switching costs. On the basis of this previous 
evidence, we expect that the mode of presentation of sentences 
might be relevant in modulating the MSE. Specifically, given 
that neither we manipulate attentional load, nor we use a dual 
task paradigm, we expect to observe a facilitation when the 
prime and the target share the same presentation and content 
modality as in prior studies where switching costs were found.  
Whether and how the conceptual MSE is affected by the mode 
of presentation of stimuli may hinge on task demands. Connell 
& Lynott (2014) found that task-specific implicit perceptual 
attention preactivates modality-specific systems leading to 
facilitated representation of semantic information related to 
those modalities. That is, preactivating the visual system 
through the presentation of strongly visual words (e.g., 
“cloudy”) facilitated performance in the lexical decision task, 
whereas preactivating the auditory system through the 
presentation of strongly auditory words (e.g., “noisy”) facilitated 
performance when the task was reading aloud. In the present 
research, we used two different tasks: the property verification 
and the lexical decision task21 (LDT, McNamara, 1992). We 
                                                          
21 This study too was initially conceived as a two experiments study. 
Experiment 1 used a property verification priming paradigm and Experiment 
2 used a lexical decision priming paradigm. However, for purposes of 
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believe that the mode of presentation of stimuli might differently 
impact the conceptual MSE on the basis of the depth of 
processing required by the task. With the property verification 
task we predict to observe a better performance when the 
presentation and the content modalities of target sentences are 
congruent (e.g., “Butter is yellowish” presented visually) 
compared to when they are incongruent (e.g., “Butter is 
yellowish” presented aurally) due to the depth of processing 
required by the task. With a less conceptually engaging task 
such as the LDT, instead, we expect that the mode of 
presentation might feature prominently compared to the content 
modality of sentences.  
 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred twenty-eight students from the University of 
Bologna (79 females; mean age: 21.45, SD: 2.37) participated in 
the experiment in exchange for course credit. Sixty-five 
participants were randomly assigned to the property verification 
task condition whereas 63 participants were randomly assigned 
to the LDT condition. All participants were Italian native 
speakers, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing 
by self-report, and were naïve as to the purpose of the 
experiment. The experiment was approved by the Psychology 
Department’s ethical committee of the University of Bologna. 
                                                                                                                             
exposition, the two experiments have become one with two conditions 
(property verification, lexical decision). 
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Written informed consent was obtained from all individual 
participants included in the study. Minors did not take part in the 
study. 
  
Materials 
Twenty-four prime sentences and forty-eight target sentences 
were used in this experiment. Stimuli were the same as in 
Scerrati et al. (2015). Half of the prime sentences had a vision-
related content (e.g., “the LIGHT is flickering”) whereas the 
other half had a hearing-related content (e.g., “the SOUND is 
echoing”). Properties in the visual and auditory prime sentences 
were taken from the norming study by Lynott and Connell 
(2009) and from a rating of 50 Italian adjectives (see Appendix 
A in Study 1). Each of the 24 prime sentences was repeated four 
times throughout the experiment, twice they were aurally 
presented over closed-ear headphones and twice they were 
visually presented on the screen.  
Target sentences were taken from the van Dantzig et al.’s 
study (2008). Twenty-four had a vision-related content (e.g., “a 
WALNUT is brown”) and twenty-four had a hearing-related 
content (e.g., “a BEE buzzes”). In these critical pairs the 
property was always true of the concept. Each pair was used 
only once. Two properties were repeated once across the pairs, 
although paired with different concepts (i.e., “a BEE buzzes”, “a 
FLY buzzes”; “BROCCOLI is green”, “SPINACH is green”). For 
an overview of the visual and auditory prime and target 
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sentences see Appendix B in Study 1. Prime and target 
sentences were the same across tasks. 
As for the property verification task, an additional set of 48 
filler sentences, always taken from van Dantzig et al. (2008) was 
used. In the filler sentences the property was always false of the 
concept. Twelve filler sentences had a false visual property (e.g., 
“the WATER is opaque”), 12 had a false auditory property (e.g., 
“the COMB sings”), whereas the remaining 24 filler sentences 
had a false property that did not belong to any modality (e.g., 
“the BED is sleepy”). This latter type of fillers was used in order 
to avoid participants from basing their answers on a superficial 
word-association strategy, rather than on deeper conceptual-
processing (see Solomon & Barsalou, 2004).  
As for the LDT, an additional set of 48 filler sentences 
featuring a non-word was used. In half of the filler sentences the 
non-word was the concept word, whereas in the other half the 
non-word was the property word. Non-words were generated 
altering two of the consonants or the double consonant keeping 
unchanged the vowels so as to preserve the phonotactic rules of 
Italian.  
Each participant was presented with 96 prime sentences 
followed by 96 target sentences (48 critical and 48 filler) 
throughout the experimental session. Prime and target sentences 
were randomly combined to form four modality conditions, that 
is: different-different (DD, when both the presentation and the 
content modalities do switch from prime to target sentence), 
different-same (DS, when the presentation modality does switch 
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but the content modality does not), same-different (SD, when 
the content modality does switch but the presentation modality 
does not) and same-same (SS, when the prime and the target 
sentences share the same presentation and content modalities). 
For example, a visually presented prime sentences with a vision-
related content (e.g., “the LIGHT is flickering”) could be 
combined with: 1) an aurally presented target sentence with a 
hearing-related content (e.g., “a BEE buzzes”, DD); 2) an aurally 
presented target sentence with a vision-related content (e.g., “a 
WALNUT is brown”, DS); 3) a visually presented prime 
sentences with a hearing-related content (e.g., “a BEE buzzes”, 
SD); 4) a visually presented prime sentences with a vision-
related content (“a WALNUT is brown”, SS). Each target 
sentence appeared in all modality conditions, counterbalanced 
across participants. 
 
Procedure 
The stimuli were presented on a 17 inch monitor (1.6 Ghz 
refresh rate). The participants sat at a viewing distance of about 
60 cm from the monitor in a dimly-lit room. They were invited 
to wear a pair of headband headphones before starting the 
experiment. Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation 
cross (0.5 cm x 0.5 cm) for 500 milliseconds (ms). Immediately 
after the fixation the prime sentence appeared on the screen or 
was delivered through headphones for 2000 ms. Then, the target 
sentence was displayed on the screen or delivered through 
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headphones until a response was given or until 4000 ms had 
elapsed. Visually presented prime and target sentences ranged 
from 5.9 cm to 17.3 cm (from 9 to 29 characters) which resulted 
in a visual angle range between 5.6° and 16.5°. All sentences 
were bold lowercase Courier new 18 and were presented in 
black in the center of a white background. Participants were 
instructed to read or to listen to the prime and target sentences 
and then judge, as quickly and accurately as possible, whether in 
each target sentence the property was true of the concept 
(property verification task condition), or whether in each target 
sentence there was a non-word or not (LDT condition). In both 
task conditions, half of the participants pressed the “s” key of a 
“qwerty” keyboard when either the property was true of the 
concept or there was a non-word in the target sentence and the 
“k” key when either the property was false of the concept or the 
target sentence did not contain a non-word. The other half of the 
participants was assigned to the reverse mapping.  
The order of presentation of each prime-target sentence was 
completely randomized across participants. Participants 
underwent a short practice session of 32 stimuli (different from 
those used in the experimental blocks) before starting the 
experiment. The experiment consisted of one block of 96 prime-
target pairs and lasted approximately 15 minutes. 
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Results 
In the property verification task condition, five participants 
(all females) were excluded from the analysis: Four of these 
participants failed to reach an accuracy score of 65% while the 
other participant responded 35% of the trials in less than 300 
ms, indicating that she may have misconceived the task and tried 
to respond on the prime sentence also. Sixty participants 
therefore remained for further analysis. Responses to filler 
sentences were discarded. Omissions (5.93%), Incorrect 
responses (21.42%) and RTs faster/slower than the overall 
participant mean minus/plus 2 standard deviations (2.19%) were 
excluded from the analyses. In the LDT condition, three 
participants (two females) failed to reach an accuracy score of 
65%. Their data were removed, leaving sixty participants for 
further analysis. Responses to filler sentences were discarded. 
Omissions (5.03%), Incorrect responses (7.04%) and RTs 
faster/slower than the overall participant mean minus/plus 2 
standard deviations (2.60%) were excluded from the analyses.  
Mean Response Times (RTs) of the correct responses were 
submitted to a Repeated Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with 
Mode of Presentation (different vs. same), Content Modality 
(different vs. same) and Target Congruency (incongruent vs. 
congruent) as the within-subject factors for the two tasks 
(property verification vs. lexical decision) separately. Data are 
shown in Table 2. 
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In the property verification task condition there was a main 
effect of Mode of Presentation, F(1, 59) = 4.582, MSe = 
75789.90, p < .05, ηp2 = .072, that is, decision latencies were 
faster when the Mode of Presentation was the same across prime 
and target sentences rather than different (M: 2036 ms vs. 2090 
ms). The analysis also revealed a main effect of Target 
Congruency (F(1, 59) = 18.633, MSe = 65906.25, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.240), that is, decision latencies were faster when the Mode of 
Presentation and the Content Modality of the target were 
congruent rather than incongruent (M: 2013 ms vs. 2114 ms). 
No other main effect or interaction turned out to be significant, 
Fs < 2.66, ps > .108. 
In the LDT condition, there was a main effect of Mode of 
Presentation, F(1, 59) = 6.544, MSe = 59889.45, p < .05, ηp2 = 
.1, that is, decision latencies were faster when the Mode of 
Presentation was the same across prime and target sentences 
rather than different (M: 1942 ms vs. 1999 ms). No other main 
effect or interaction turned out to be significant, Fs < 1.420, ps > 
.238. 
Mean of the incorrect responses were submitted to an 
ANOVA with the same factors as those of the RTs analysis. In 
the property verification task condition no main effect or 
interaction turned out to be significant, Fs < 2.247, ps > .139. In 
the LDT condition there was a significant interaction between 
Mode of Presentation and Target Congruency, F(1,59) = 4.484, 
MSe = 140.56, p < .05, ηp2 = .071. Paired-sample t-tests showed 
that percentage of ERs was higher when the Mode of 
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Presentation was the same across prime and target sentences 
and the target was congruent compared to different and 
incongruent (9.5% vs. 6.8%), t(59) = -2.075, p <.05 same and 
incongruent (9.5% vs. 5.8%), t(59) = -2.225, p < .05 and 
different and congruent (9.5% vs. 5.9%), t(59) = -2.327, p < .05. 
No other main effect or interaction turned out to be significant, 
Fs < 2.683, ps > .107. 
 
General Discussion 
The present research investigated whether and to what extent 
switching between different modes of presentation (i.e., visual, 
aural) across prime and target sentences affects the conceptual 
MSE. Although previous studies investigated how sentence 
processing can be affected by mode of presentation of linguistic 
stimuli, such relationship had not previously been studied in the 
context of the MSE. Given that the impact of the mode of 
presentation of stimuli on language processing may be 
modulated by task demands (see Connell and Lynott, 2014 for a 
similar result in a different context), we compared performance 
on a property verification priming paradigm with performance 
on a lexical decision priming paradigm, each involving different 
levels of conceptual processing.  
In keeping with our hypothesis, we found evidence for the 
involvement of the mode of presentation of stimuli in both the 
property verification and the lexical decision task. Crucially, 
results from both tasks showed that the presentation-driven 
effect weakens the conceptual MSE. Indeed, a conceptual MSE 
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was observed in the property verification task, but not in LDT, 
as expected; however, it did not reach significance. 
Interestingly, the property verification task highlighted an 
effect of the target congruency. That is, we found that 
participants were slower in deciding whether a certain property 
was true of the concept when the presentation and the content 
modality were incongruent for the target (e.g., “a BEE buzzes” 
presented visually) compared to when they were congruent. 
Such a within-target MSE is in line with the results of van 
Dantzig et al. (2008) showing that when a perceptual stimulus 
(i.e., a light flash, a tone or a vibration) and a subsequent target 
sentence were in a different sensory modality decision latencies 
were slower compared to when they were in the same modality. 
Our results broaden their finding showing such an effect within 
the same stimulus, that is, when the processing of perceptual and 
conceptual information overlaps in time. It is worth noting that 
such interference only occurred with the property verification 
task. Therefore, it seems likely that since the lexical decision 
task did not emphasize conceptual processing, it only recruited 
the semantic system to a certain extent insufficient to generate 
interference between the two systems. 
In sum, our findings show that conceptual processing is not 
only affected by switching between sensory modalities on a 
semantic level (i.e., content modality of stimuli) but also by 
switching between sensory modalities on a purely perceptual 
level (i.e., mode of presentation of stimuli). Interestingly, our 
results also demonstrate a task-dependent, complex interplay of 
 122  
 
perceptual and semantic information taking place within the 
target. These findings question the view according to which the 
MSE does not reveal anything about semantic processing as 
claimed by the opponents of the grounded accounts of 
knowledge (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008).  
We conclude that the MSE is a task-related, multilevel effect 
which can occur on two different levels of information 
processing, i.e., perceptual and semantic. We interpret these 
results as further evidence supporting the likelihood that the 
perceptual and conceptual systems are tightly interwoven and 
share the same processing mechanisms as claimed by the 
simulation account of conceptual processing (Barsalou, 1999, 
2003, 2008).  
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Table  
Table 2: Mean Response Times (in Milliseconds) and Percentage of Errors with Standard Deviations in parenthesis as 
a Function of Mode of Presentation (MoP: Different, Same), Content Modality (CM: Different, Same) and Target 
Congruency (TC: incongruent, congruent) for each tasks separately. 
 
Property verification Lexical decision 
 RT ERs RT ERs 
  D S D S D S D S 
MoP 2090 (338.6) 2036 (340.2) 21 (17) 21 (15.9) 1999 (337.9) 1942 (268.8) 6 (10.4) 7 (10.9) 
CM 2080 (357.2) 2046 (321.6) 20 (16.4) 22 (16.5) 1972 (309.7) 1968 (297) 7 (10.9) 6 (10.4) 
TC 
I C I C I C I C 
2114 (340.5) 2013 (338.3) 22 (16.2) 20 (16.7) 1972 (304.7) 1968 (302) 6 (10) 7 (11.3) 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This dissertation has motivated and defended an analysis of 
the format of concepts. The analysis gives a treatment of the 
ongoing theoretic debate on the format of concepts, contrasting 
important classes of theories weighing in on the debate: the 
amodal, grounded and hybrid accounts of knowledge. 
Importantly, the analysis also explores predictions coming from 
such accounts on experimental grounds, testing the scope and 
robustness of the Modality-Switch Effect (MSE), a cost for 
performance in terms of speed and accuracy occurring when two 
different sensory modality properties for concepts alternate 
compared to when the same sensory modality property is 
presented.  
The theoretic and experimental investigations developed in 
this dissertation provide new insights in order to construct a 
unified account of the nature of concepts that emphasizes 
important mechanisms of brain organization and functioning 
ensuing from all of the examined theories. In particular, the 
modality-specific organization of knowledge common to amodal 
sensory/functional and grounded theories of knowledge together 
with the reuse of sensory-motor circuitry for the representation 
of concepts typical of the grounded framework, and the 
topographical mapping between the physical structure of the 
world and the spatial organization or topography of the brain’s 
association areas developed in the context of the hybrid accounts 
of knowledge (the conceptual topography theory, CTT) all seem 
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very important principles of neural organization and 
functioning.  
Perhaps the most surprising results comes from the 
experimental investigation of the MSE carried out in this 
dissertation. Four experiments were devised to investigate 
different predictions coming from both amodal and grounded 
perspectives. First, if conceptual processing exploits 
sensorimotor systems, then a cost similar to that found in the 
perception literature should occur when verifying different-
modality properties for concepts. Study 1 confirms this 
prediction, replicating Pecher et al.’s (2003) results, and further 
demonstrates that the MSE is due to exogenous attentional 
mechanisms that automatically activate sensory information 
during a perceptual simulation.  
Second, if the MSE was due to symbols in an amodal symbols 
system organized so that to reflect their modality, then results 
were not supposed to show a MSE when participants were not 
required to perform any task on the prime sentences. That is, in 
these experiments (Study 1) it was completely unnecessary to 
directly and explicitly pre-activate a specific sensory modality. 
Nevertheless, participants could not avoid it. Therefore, the 
MSE found by these studies is likely to reflect an automatic pre-
activation of sensory modalities as it is expected to occur during 
a perceptual simulation. 
Third, the discovery that the MSE also emerges with spoken 
sentences that automatically triggers the pre-activation of a 
sensory modality constitutes an innovative demonstration that 
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the effect arises during both reading and speech processing. 
Thus, not only reading but also listening to a sentence describing 
perceptual properties suffice to spark off a simulation as shown 
by Experiment 2 (Study 1).  
Fourth, if the MSE does not reveal anything about semantic 
processing as claimed by the opponents of the grounded 
accounts, then one could not explain results from Study 2 
(Experiments 3 & 4). Specifically, the finding that the mode of 
presentation of stimuli affects the MSE in both the property 
verification (Experiment 3) and the lexical decision task 
(Experiment 4) is intriguing and difficult to accomodate in the 
context of amodal accounts. Crucially, results from both tasks 
showed that the presentation-driven effect weakens the 
conceptual MSE leading to the conclusion that the MSE is a 
multilevel effect. Interestingly, these results demonstrate a task-
dependent, complex interplay of perceptual and semantic 
information not easy to account for in the amodal framework. 
Overall, although it is possible that an amodal conceptual hub 
exists in the brain, this does not necessarily entail that all 
conceptual knowledge has an amodal format. The experiments 
reported in this dissertation show that perceptual mechanisms 
are involved in conceptual processing. Hybrid solutions seems 
the most promising given extant data from behavioral, 
neuroimaging and neuropsychological research.  
Of course, a number of problems concerning the format of 
concepts remain unsolved. For example, we cannot determine 
the representational format of specific brain regions (Martin, 
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2016). Nevertheless, we can hypothesize that conceptual 
processing use modality-specific resources whatever format 
concepts have (Barsalou, 2016). 
In sum, I hope to have shown that the research on the 
representation and processing of concepts in the brain can play 
an important role for discovering new and important cognitive 
mechanisms underlying the organization of knowledge in the 
human brain. Understanding how we organize our knowledge is 
of crucial importance given that without an organization it is 
easy to imagine how our mental life could turn in a chaotic 
muddle that would prevent any kind of thought, activity and not 
last consciousness. 
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